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TRIBAL EMPLOYMENT SEPARATION: TRIBAL LAW
ENIGMA, TRIBAL GOVERNANCE PARADOX, AND
TRIBAL COURT CONUNDRUM
Matthew L.M. Fletcher*
Each year, more and more people--Indians and non-Indians--are employed by
Indian Tribes and Tribally-chartered organizations. However, as Tribal employ-
ment grows, so do the problems associated with personnel disputes. Tribal
employment is different than traditional corporate or even government employment
because Tribal communities are incredibly close-knit and Tribal governments are
very accountable to their constituents. Because of this dynamic, employment sepa-
rations can create excessive difficulty within a Tribe. Many Tribal courts apply the
principles of the Supreme Court's decision in Loudermill, granting terminated
employees the right to both an administrative and judicial hearing. However, these
processes can often be incredibly painful for terminated employees and the adminis-
trative Tribal panels. They often undermine Tribal government operations and
communities. To ameliorate some of these difficulties, Tribes should consider alter-
native ways to deal with employment separations. For example, Tribes might
consider a separate court of employee claims, a Peacemaker Court model, or an
automatic monetary remedy. Overall, any solution that rejects the dominant cul-
ture's model and accommodates the particular needs of Tribal communities would
be an improvement.
"External rules and interpretations do not apply to the internal
matters of the tribe. Application of such is recognized as inap-
propriate in the law. It would destroy the unique traditional,
cultural and community attributes of tribal communities. In
addition, uniform application of external measurements would
destroy the diversity that exists among the many tribal commu-
nities themselves."'
* Assistant Professor, North Dakota School of Law. Director, Northern Plains Indian
Law Center. Appellate Judge, Pokagon Band of Potawatomi Indians and Turtle Mountain
Band of Chippewa Indians. BA. 1994, University of Michigan; J.D. 1997, University of
Michigan Law School. Member, Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians.
Many of the observations contained in this Article are based on the author's experiences as
in-house counsel for four Indian tribes, the Pascua Yaqui Tribe of Arizona, the Hoopa Valley
Tribe, the Suquamish Tribe, and the Grand Traverse Band.
Chi-megwetch to Kirsten Matoy Carlson for commenting on an earlier draft; Andrea
Delgadillo, Jessica Margolin, and the editors of the University of Michigan Journal of Law Re-
form for excellent edits and suggestions; and to Wenona Singel as always.
1. Raphael v. Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians, No. 90-01-001-CV,
slip op. at 2-3 (Grand Traverse Band Tribal Ct. Apr. 16, 1996) (on file with University of
MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
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"The essence of sovereignty is the right of the people of a na-
tion to decide what their body ofjurisprudence shall be. In so
doing, tribal courts and legislatures may view issues within the
context of their community and not those of other sovereign-
ties where social, cultural, economic and political forces not
found in the tribal history are at work.
2
"Anglo-American concepts of fairness and civil rights are
sometimes inappropriate, in their raw form, to Indian com-
munities. These concepts can be applied only in conjunction
with the unique cultural, social, and political attributes of the
Indian heritage."3
INTRODUCTION-BEAR TENZING'S FABLE
Listen.4 Imagine that Bear Tenzing is the son of a Nepalese im-
migrant man who is a steelworker, and a Michigan Ottawa woman
who is a university administrator with a Master's Degree in Educa-
tion. Although they were mostly employed throughout Bear's
childhood in Grand Rapids, Michigan, Bear's parents are not
wealthy. Bear is forced to pay his own way through college and
graduate school at a small private school in northern Indiana. Sad-
dled with considerable debt, he dedicates himself to working for
the benefit of Indian Tribes. Like his mother, Bear is a member of
a northern Michigan Ottawa Tribe that was federally recognized in
the late 1980s. He works for several years with a small organization
in northern Wisconsin that provides environmental services and
consulting to Wisconsin Indian Tribes. He is paid very little by in-
dustry standards. The organization is entirely grant-funded and
subject to constant threat of budget line-item elimination. After
nearly ten years of employment with the organization, Bear is left
unemployed when the federal agency funding dries up.
Within a few months, two Tribal Council Members from his own
Tribe in northern Michigan contact him about a new job. He
knows these Council Members from various conferences and meet-
2. Frechette v. Menominee Tribal Enter., 24 Indian L. Rptr. 6082, 6083 (Menominee
Tribal Ct. Nov. 19, 1995).
3. In Ye The Sacred Arrows, No. CNA-CRM-90-28, 1990 WL 656052 at *3 (Cheyenne-
Arapaho Tribes Dist. Ct.July 11, 1990).
4. This fictional narrative is an amalgamation of circumstances surrounding several
different employment separation cases litigated by the author in various tribal courts in
Arizona, California, Washington, and Michigan.
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ings he has attended over the years. Half-heartedly, the Council
Members have often joked over the years about bringing Bear to
the reservation to work for his own Tribe. This time, when these
two Council Members contact Bear, they are serious about recruit-
ing him to fill the Tribal Manager position within the Tribe. This
would require Bear to be responsible for the entire Tribal Gov-
ernment operation and to report to the Tribal Council. They tell
Bear that they have watched him for several years and have been
impressed with the way he handles himself in meetings and con-
ferences. A singular goal of the Tribal Government is to bring back
as many Tribal Members as possible, especially those who are edu-
cated. As they know Bear has been underpaid working for the
nonprofit organization in Wisconsin, they will pay him significantly
more.
Bear brings back this news to his partner Emily and tells her that
he is excited by the opportunity to return to Michigan. Emily is
completing her doctorate in environmental remediation from
home. Emily and Bear have been waiting to get married for several
years because of the uncertainty of Bear's job at the nonprofit or-
ganization. A month later, Bear interviews with the nine members
of the Tribal Council at the Tribal administration building. Two
days later, the Tribal Council offers him the job as Tribal Manager.
In the excitement, Bear and Emily get engaged. They move to
northern Michigan to settle down.
Bear's first four months with the Tribe are the best four months
of his professional career. He meets distant relatives for the first
time and other people that knew him as a small child when his
mother helped them through college in her job as a university ad-
ministrator. The managers he supervises are mostly Tribal
Members who get along very well with Bear. He enjoys the work
immensely and looks forward to going to the office every morning.
Emily meets the Tribe's environmental services director and the
fisheries biologists. They help her with her research and take her
out onto Lake Michigan to study and collect samples.
But the newjob is not entirely fun. One of Bear's responsibilities
is the personnel function. As the head of the Tribal Government,
Bear must make the final decision when one of his managers rec-
ommends the discharge of an employee. Because the vast majority
of Tribal Government employees are Tribal Members, these deci-
sions affect many people in the community. Bear adopts a policy of
standing in support of his managers and rarely overturns their de-
cisions. Due to a Tribal Court ruling from the early 1990s, the
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Tribal Council adopted an internal review board to administra-
tively review all employment discharges. After a discharge, Bear
and his manager must present their case to the review board, along
with the discharged employee. The board consists of six employees
elected by Tribal Government employees and five employees ap-
pointed by Bear as the Tribal Manager. Each year, the employees
and the Tribal Manager select another panel of board members. At
first, the new panelists are excited to be chosen, but the rigors of
making decisions that affect such a fundamental part of their col-
leagues' lives becomes a tremendous burden. No one asks to be
reappointed or reelected to the board.
Bear participates in two of these hearings in his first four
months. While both of the discharged employees present strong
and sometimes emotional defenses, these cases are resolved with-
out much difficulty in favor of Bear and his managers. Neither
employee chooses to appeal the decision to the Tribal Court,
though each had the opportunity to do so under Tribal law. Bear is
sorely shaken by these proceedings that, in his opinion, are unfair
to the discharged employee and generally dehumanizing to every-
one involved. He realizes how difficult it is for the board members
to participate in the hearings and can only imagine how difficult it
must be for the discharged employee.
In Bear's fifth month, a particularly nasty dispute erupts between
one of his managers and an employee, named Linus Mitchell, who is
a close relative of a Tribal Council Member. In fact, the dispute had
been festering for several years between these two employees, long
before Bear's tenure started. Bear attempts to mediate the dispute,
which appears to be based entirely on differences in personality, but
without a positive result. A few days after the attempted mediation,
the manager approaches Bear with an allegation that the Linus had
threatened to deface the manager's automobile. The manager wants
permission to fire Linus. Bear again brings Linus in to face the man-
ager. The employee grudgingly admits to making the threat, but
states that he has a long history of making these kinds of threats.
He states he has never been disciplined for it before and certainly
has never carried out the threats. He asserts that people who know
him well, including the manager, know that these are empty
threats. He concludes by telling Bear that he has been employed
with the Tribe since federal recognition in the late 1980s-almost
twenty years. Bear points out that the Tribe's personnel policy in-
cludes a provision that the Tribe has a zero-tolerance policy
regarding threats to person or property. He agrees with the man-
ager that the employee should be discharged. The employee's
[VOL. 38:2
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discharge is reviewed by the hearing panel and is upheld by a nar-
row six-to-five vote. The employee hires a major East Coast law firm
and files suit in Tribal Court to appeal the decision. The Tribe's
general counsel discusses the facts and the law with Bear and as-
sures him that the Tribe has an excellent defense to the appeal
although she is very concerned that a large, corporate law firm has
taken such an active interest in a small Tribal employment case.
Nevertheless, she expects to prevail in the Tribal Court litigation
and compliments Bear on his professionalism and attention to
procedure.
Shortly thereafter, three Tribal Council Members, including
both council members that had recruited Bear to work for the
Tribe and a close relative of the employee that Bear had most re-
cently fired, approached Bear for a meeting. Bear is apprehensive
about the meeting, but all three assure him that his decision was
the correct one and that they will stand by him in the event of a
political squabble. Bear relaxes and says that he appreciates their
support.
In the sixth month of Bear's employment, a political dispute
arises between the three Tribal Council Members who support
Bear's work and the remainder of the Council. A few other Council
Members argue that the only thing that Bear has accomplished has
been the firing of Tribal Members. It is a rhetorical argument, but
one that resonates within the Council. Moreover, several of the
Council Members do not have college or high school degrees. These
council members feel that, at times, Bear and other college-
educated employees act condescendingly toward them. Bear learned
years ago in his previous job that is easy for the educated employees
to talk over the heads of the less educated Council Members. While
he attempts to keep Council Members involved in meetings on
complicated policy and legal issues, Bear has noticed their continu-
ing frustrations with him and his staff. At a closed session of the
Tribal Council, although three Members argue vehemently for
Bear, the remainder of the Council votes to discharge him.
Bear is devastated. He considers letting the issue go and finding
anotherjob, but in the six months he worked for the Tribe, he and
Emily have developed a strong attachment to the community. They
have bought a house, made many friends, and want to stay within
the tribal community. Emily's time spent with the Tribal biologists
has significantly improved her dissertation work. Bear has culti-
vated relationships with distant relatives who have vast knowledge
about his family's past. Bear files an appeal with the internal review
WINTER 2005]
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board. The Tribal Council responds before the hearing with a let-
ter stating that the board will not convene to hear Bear's appeal
because Bear's discharge was a political decision not subject to re-
view by the board. After a long discussion with Emily, Bear looks up
an old friend who is an attorney in Grand Rapids and asks her to
represent him in a Tribal Court lawsuit.
Five months later, Bear is still unemployed but he is considering
an offer to move to Washington State to become a manager for an
inter-tribal organization. He does not want to leave Michigan after
nearly a year in the community, but his funds are nearly gone. His
attorney, Veronica Hurst, is acting on a pro bono basis, hoping to
win attorney fees from the court if Bear prevails. After Veronica
files the complaint in Tribal Court, the Court grants the Tribe an
extra sixty days to respond. For Bear, the wait is intolerable. The
Tribe eventually responds with a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim and asserts sovereign immunity as a defense. Bear and
Veronica go to the Court for the hearing and, while waiting outside
the courtroom for another hearing to end, Bear bumps into Linus
Mitchell, who is dropping off a pleading of his own at the court.
After introduction rendered uncomfortable because of their
previous professional dispute, Bear and Linus begin to talk. Linus
says that his appeal hearing is scheduled for the following week.
His case has been going on two months longer than Bear's case
and his unemployment insurance has run out. Linus says that the
Tribe offered to rehire him at a different job with a lower rate of
pay if he would agree to drop the appeal. His big city attorneys
withdrew from the case after the Tribal Court ruled that while
Linus would be entitled to reinstatement if he won, he was not en-
titled to tort damages or back pay. Linus says he went through the
same process seven years earlier when another Tribal Manager
fired him. In that case, it took eleven months after filing the com-
plaint before Linus received a decision from the Tribal Court.
When Linus won, the Tribe appealed to the Tribal Court of Ap-
peals. Linus had to wait another nine months before the Court of
Appeals affirmed his victory. By then, the Tribe had to give him his
job back and pay him twenty months back pay, benefits, and inter-
est. Shortly thereafter, the Tribal Council changed the law to
prohibit back pay awards. Although Linus eventually received a
check for almost $90,000, he was broke for two years. He lost his
car, his house, and had to move in with his sister and her family. In
the end, Linus had to go back to work for the man who fired him
in the first place-the very same man who had just convinced Bear
to fire Linus again a second time.
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Bear's hearing went badly. He could tell that the court wasn't
agreeing with any of Veronica's arguments about piercing the veil
of sovereign immunity. Four months later, the judge issued a deci-
sion that while she agreed with Bear's attorney that the Tribe
should not have denied him an appeal, she could not force the
Tribe to act since it had asserted its sovereign immunity. By then,
Bear had already relocated to Washington to work in Spokane,
2500 miles from home. He didn't want to face the people who had
decided his fate, and he was sure they didn't want to face him ei-
ther. He never heard whether Linus succeeded in being reinstated.
There is not a happy ending to this story, only a middling, unsat-
isfactory conclusion. The story serves to provide an overview of
many of the issues that arise in employment discharges in Indian
Country.5 As stated by the Grand Traverse Band Tribal Court, "The
intent is not [to] be critical, but to provide a fair and objective
analysis of how our tribal government really operates, in order for
[Tribal policymakers] to make informed decisions that are consis-
tent with reality.,
6
This Article discusses the difficulty of employment separations
in Indian Country. The central premise of this Article is that Euro-
American law and jurisprudence is uniquely unsuited to Indian
Tribes and Tribal Courts. The result of the implementation of em-
ployment separation law and jurisprudence by Tribes and Tribal
Courts is unnecessary litigation and emotional suffering. Part I of
this Article describes the characteristics of employment with Indian
Tribes and Tribal organizations. Tribes are usually close-knit com-
munities that generally employ a significant percentage of Tribal
Members. Part II describes the legal structures required by the Euro-
American legal system as imposed on Indian Tribes and considers
5. Few legal commentators delve into this area of the law-Tribal employment law as
applied in Tribal Courts. See, e.g., Carole E. Goldberg, Individual Rights and Tribal Revitaliza-
tion, 35 ARiz. ST. L.J. 889 (2003); Kaighn Smith, Jr., Civil Rights and Tribal Employment, 47
FED. LAw. 34 (2000); Nell Jessup Newton, Tribal Court Praxis: One Year in the Life of Twenty
Indian Tribal Courts, 22 Am. INDIAN L. REv. 285 (1998); Robert J. McCarthy, Civil Rights in
Tribal Courts: The Indian Bill of Rights at Thirty Years, 34 IDAHO L. REv. 465 (1998). Only two
articles focus exclusively on this area. SeeVickiJ. Limas, Employment Suits Against Indian Tribes:
Balancing Sovereign Rights and Civil Rights, 70 DENV. U. L. REv. 359 (1993); C. William Rice,
Employment in Indian Country: Considerations Respecting Tribal Regulation of the Employer-Employee
Relationship, 72 N.D. L. REv. 267 (1996).
6. Adams v. Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians Econ. Dev. Auth.,
No. 89-03-001-CV, slip op. at 4-5 (decision on motion to dismiss) (Grand Traverse Band
Tribal Ct.June 18, 1992) (on file with University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
7. For purposes of this Article, the term "employment separation" includes involun-
tary termination of employment through discharge, constructive discharge, firing, and lay-
off.
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how these structures create significant legal problems for Tribes
and social problems for Indian communities. Part III analyzes the
Tribal law of sovereign immunity as it applies to lawsuits by dis-
charged employees in Tribal Courts. Part V proposes a number of
solutions to reduce harms associated with employment separations.
Since most Tribes have adopted significant portions of Euro-
American law and jurisprudence, a blanket restructuring of Tribal
legal systems would be extremely difficult. This proposal cuts
through many of the problems associated with adjudicating Tribal
employment separation disputes.
I. THE ENIGMA OF EMPLOYMENT WITHIN INDIAN TRIBES
Each year, more and more people are employed by Indian
Tribes" and Tribally-chartered organizations such as housing au-
thorities,9 community colleges,10 health care centers,11 utilities, 2
corporations," and business enterprises.1 4 Indians and non-Indians
are increasingly operating businesses and employing individuals
within Indian Country.5 Tribal governments may also delegate au-
thority to employ individuals to subordinate organizations such as
8. See, e.g., Gallegos v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, No. 02-2347, 2003 WL 22854632, at *3
(10th Cir. Nov. 28, 2003) (discussing Tribe's employment of police officer); Penobscot Na-
tion v. Fellencer, 164 F.3d 706, 707 (1st Cir. 1999) (discussing Tribe's employment of nurse),
cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1022 (1999).
9. See, e.g., Equal Employ. Opp. Comm'n v. Karuk Tribe Hous. Auth., 260 F.3d 1071,
1073-74 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing Indian housing authority employment); Duke v. Absen-
tee Shawnee Tribe of Okla. Hous. Auth., 119 F.3d 1123, 1124 (10th Cir. 1999) (discussing
Indian housing authority chartered as state agency).
10. See, e.g., Hagen v. Sisseton-Wahpeton Cmty. Coll., 205 F.3d 1040, 1042 (8th Cir.
2000) (discussing a tribally-chartered community college).
11. See, e.g., NLRB v. Chapa de Indian Health Program, Inc., 316 E3d 995, 997 (9th
Cir. 2003) (discussing an Indian health advisory board that operated an Indian health
clinic); Smart v. State Farm Ins. Co., 868 F.2d 929, 930 (7th Cir. 1989) (discussing a health
care center owned and operated by a Tribe).
12. See, e.g., Navajo Tribal Util. Auth. v. Ariz. Dept. of Revenue, 608 F.2d 1228, 1229
(9th Cir. 1979) (discussing a utility owned by Tribe).
13. See, e.g., Dixon v. Picopa Const. Co., 772 P.2d 1104, 1105 (Ariz. 1989) (discussing a
construction company incorporated under Tribal law).
14. See, e.g., Fla. Paraplegic, Ass'n v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla., 166 E3d 1126,
1127 (11th Cir. 1999) (discussing a restaurant and entertainment facility owned by a Tribe);
Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Nevins, 881 F.2d 657, 658 (9th Cir. 1989) (discussing a timber com-
pany owned by Tribe); Indian Country U.S.A., Inc. v. State of Okla. ex reL Okla. Tax
Commission, 829 F.2d 967, 970 (10th Cir. 1987) (discussing a Tribe's bingo operations);
Trudgeon v. Fantasy Springs Casino, 84 Cal. Rptr. 2d 65, 66 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (discussing
a casino owned by Tribe).
15. See, e.g., NLRB v. Pueblo of San Juan, 276 F.3d 1186, 1189 (10th Cir. 2002) (discuss-
ing a lumber company operated on lands leased from San Juan Pueblo).
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housing authorities. There are over 560 federally recognized In-
dian Tribes and hundreds of Tribal organizations, 7 each with
varying governmental and enterprise structures.
As Tribal employment grows, so do the problems associated with
personnel disputes.18 Since few, if any, state laws and regulations
govern Tribal employment relationships,' 9 the Tribe must prepare
its own statutory and regulatory structures. Tribal organizations
typically prepare and adopt personnel guides, handbooks, manu-
als, policies, regulations, and statutes to govern employment
relationships. If the Tribe is newly recognized or is chartering an
organization, these documents must be prepared quickly.
In many ways, Tribal governments and organizations operate in
ways similar to a non-tribal employer such as a local government or a
privately held corporation. There is a hierarchical structure to
most Tribal governments evidenced in the Tribal Constitutions, par-
ticularly those constitutions imposed upon the Tribes by the
Department of the Interior. These so-called "IRA constitutions,"
were developed by the Department of the Interior when Tribes
began to reorganize in accordance with the 1934 Indian Reorganiza-
tion Act ("IRA").2° Interior officials consciously developed the IRA
constitutions to follow the model of a municipality with its concomi-
tant limitations on governmental powers.2 ' However, the
16. See, e.g., Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians v. Grand Traverse
Band Hous. Entity, No. 98-07-238-CV, slip op. at 1-2 (decision on application for injunctive
relief) (Grand Traverse Band Tribal Ct. Aug. 14, 1998) (on file with University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform).
17. See Indian Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United
States Bureau of Indian Affairs, 68 Fed. Reg. 68180 (Dec. 5, 2003).
18. See Limas, supra note 5, at 359 (discussing the increase in employment suits in
tribal courts); see also Lou Hirsh &Jim Sams, Tribal Employment is Growing, DESERT SUN (Las
Vegas, Nev.), June 2, 2004, at El, available at 2004 WL 64246924 (reporting that tribal em-
ployment was up nearly 17 percent).
19. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1964) (excluding Indian tribes from the Civil Rights Act
of 1964); 42 U.S.C. 12111(5)(b)(1) (1990) (excluding Indian tribes from the Americans
with Disabilities Act); Equal Employ. Opp. Comm'n v. Karuk Tribe Hous. Auth., 260 F.3d
1071 (9th Cir. 2001) (interpreting the Age Discrimination in Employment Act to not apply
to Indian tribes).
20. SeeWheeler-Howard Act (Indian Reorganization Act), ch. 576, 48 Stat. 984 (1934).
21. See STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 90 (3rd ed., Southern
Ill. Univ. Press 2002). Pevar explains:
The Secretary was directed by the [IRA] to approve constitutions that created a tribal
council possessing the authority to employ legal counsel; negotiate contracts with
federal, state, and local governments; and prevent the disposition of tribal property
without the tribe's permission. The Secretary encouraged tribes, in addition, to give
their councils the power to borrow money and pledge tribal property as security for
loans; to levy and collect taxes and impose licenses; to establish a tribal court system
and enact a criminal code; to remove from the reservation nonmembers whose
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
hierarchical structure imposed on the Tribes did not resemble the
more traditional, non-hierarchical forms of government utilized by
the Tribes at that time.2 2
The IRA Constitutions focus on the Tribal Council as the leader-
ship of the Tribe, much like a Board of Directors is the head of a
corporation. Members of the Tribe are similar to shareholders in a
corporation. Tribe Members have the power to vote for the leader-
ship. In some Constitutions, the Members meet each year as a
General Council with the authority to enact legislation. Usually, the
Constitution provides for a Chief Executive Officer, such as a
Chairman, a President, a Chief, or an Ogema. In most instances,
the Constitutions create a separation of powers between the Chief
Executive and the Legislature.22 Generally, but not always, the Con-
stitutions allow for the creation of a Tribal Court by the Tribal
Council.24 More recent Constitutions following the IRA model cre-
ate a Tribal Court as a separate entity, similar to the United States
Constitutional model.25
Depending on the government model, personnel decisions fall
into the hands of one of a number of tribal leaders. In Constitu-
tional governments following the three-headed branch of
government model, personnel decisions are an executive function.
If there is a separation of powers between the Executive and the
Legislative, then the Chairman or Ogema will make the final deci-
sions on personnel questions. If there is no separation, then the
presence was injurious to the tribe; and to create subordinate tribal organizations for
economic, educational, or other purposes.
Id. (footnote omitted).
22. See id. at 90-91. Pevar further explains:
[T]he IRA was enacted with little input from tribes, and those tribes that adopted
IRA constitutions had to follow a model that created a government acceptable to
non-Indian leaders in Washington. For many tribes, the IRA has resulted "in the con-
centration of power [in the hands of a few people] that had not previously existed"
and in the adoption of a government that often ignores "the unique governing tradi-
tions and structures of the Indian nation."
Id. (quoting Robert B. Porter, Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty Through Government Reform: What
Are the Issues?, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 72, 84 (1997); Robert B. Porter, Decolonizing Indige-
nous Governance: Observations on Restoring Greater Faith and Legitimacy in the Government of the
Seneca Nation, 8 KaN.J.L. & PUB. POL'v 97, 98 (1999)).
23. See PEVAR, supra note 21, at 91.
24. Alvin J. Ziontz, After Martinez: Civil Rights Under Tribal Government, 12 U.C. DAvis L.
Rav. 1, 10-33 (1979).
25. See, e.g., GRAND TRAVERSE BAND OF OTTAWA & CHIPPEWA INDIANS CONST. art. V
(Tribal Judiciary), § 1 available at http://thorpe.ou.edu/constitution/GTBcons3.html (on
file with the University of Michigan journal of Law Reform).
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Tribal Council has the final say.26 At some point, it is extremely
likely that the elected members of the Tribal Executive and Legis-
lative branches will make a decision to opt out of day-to-day
personnel decisions. Most Tribes enact a statute or regulation pro-
viding for a clear line of authority as to personnel decisions. The
Tribal policymakers might delegate their personnel authority to
either the head employee, often called the Tribal Manager, or the
personnel department manager." Or they might not.
A. Employment of Tribal Members
The majority of employees working for Indian Tribes are often
Tribal members. 8 In fact, Tribal member employment is often
cited as a critical side-benefit to the Congressional and Presidential
policy of self-determination for Indian tribes.29 One example of the
importance of Tribal employment to Tribal members is the Turtle
Creek Casino:
In fiscal year 2001, Turtle Creek provided approximately 89%
of the [Grand Traverse Band of Ottowa's gaming revenue.
The casino now employs approximately 500 persons, ap-
proximately half of whom are tribal members. Revenues from
the Turtle Creek Casino also fund approximately 270 addi-
tional tribal government positions, which administer a variety
of governmental programs, including health care, elder care,
child care, youth services, education, housing, economic de-
velopment and law enforcement. The casino also provides
some of the best employment opportunities in the region,
26. See generally Newton, supra note 5, at 346 ("Judicial review is a relatively new phe-
nomenon in tribal courts." (footnote omitted)).
27. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians, No. 98-14-
148-CV, slip op. at 4 (decision on motion for summary disposition) (Grand Traverse Band
Tribal Ct. Feb. 7, 2000) (on file with University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
28. See Brief of Amici Curiae Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians et al.
at 14-15, Taxpayers of Mich. Against Casinos v. State, 685 N.W.2d 221 (Mich. 2004) (No.
122830), available at http://courts.michigan.gov/supremecourt/Clerk/03-04/122830/
122830-Amicus-GrTraverse.pdf (on file with University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
29. See generally WILLIAM C. CANBY, JR., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW IN A NUTSHELL 29-33
(4th ed. 2004).
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and all of its employees are eligible for health insurance bene-
fits, disability benefits and 401 (k) benefit plans.0
One reason that so many Tribal members work for Tribal em-
ployers is that federal law permits Indian Tribes to initiate Indian
preference policies that allow Tribes to grant a hiring and em-
ployment preference to Indians.!' This preference extends to
businesses operating on or near an Indian reservation. Many
Tribes also extend a preference to Tribal Members over non-
Member Indians.3
More and more Tribal Members are entering college and pro-
fessional schools and graduating with advanced degrees. Federal
recognition of Indian Tribes and the enactment of statutes such as
the 1975 Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act
4
allow Indian Tribes to financially support Tribal Member pursuits
in higher education. Affirmative action programs provide addi-
tional opportunities for Tribal Members to enroll in universities
and graduate programs.3" As such, many Tribal Members return to
their own reservations with college and professional degrees. Still
other Indians with degrees work for Indian Tribes that are not
their own. 6 In the last few decades, there has been a dramatic up-
swing in the number of educated Indians, many of them working
for Indian Tribes.37
30. Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians v. United States Att'y for the
W. Dist. of Mich., 198 F. Supp. 2d 920, 926 (W.D. Mich. 2002), aff'd, 369 E3d 960 (6th Cir.
2004).
31. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Ho-Chunk Nation, No. CV 01-16, slip op. at 4-7 (Ho-
Chunk Nation Trial Ct. Oct. 3, 2003) (stating Ho-Chunk Nation's preference
policy), available at http://www.ho-chunknation.com/government/judicial/opinions/2003/
CV%2001-16,%2019,%2021%200rder%20_Final%20Judgment_.pdf (on file with University
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); DeSouza v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 31 Indian L.
Rptr. 6015, 6015-16 (Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ct. Dec. 29, 2003) (discussing Indian
Preference Policy of Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enterprise); Smith v. Confederated Sal-
ish & Kootenai Tribes, 23 Indian L. Rptr. 6256, 6257 (Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes
of Flathead Reservation Ct. App. Aug. 8, 1996).
32. See, e.g., Dawavendewa v. Salt River Project Agric. Improvnent and Power Dist., 276
F.3d 1150, 1153 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing Navajo Nation's tribal preference policy as ap-
plied to on-reservation, non-Indian owned entities).
33. Id.
34. Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88
Stat. 2203 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C.)
35. See generally Brief of Amici Curiae University of Michigan Asian Pacific American
Law Students et. al., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241), reprinted in 10
MICH.J. GENDER & L. 7 (2003).
36. See generally Jennifer Nutt Carleton, State Income Taxation of Nonmember Indians in In-
dian County, 27 AM. INDIAN L. REv. 253 (2002-03).
37. See Tom Carr, GT Band Applauds Diversity Ruling: Race-based policies have made differ-
ence, TRAVERSE Ciry RECORD-EAGLE, June 25, 2003, available at http://www.gtherald.com/
2003/jun/24band.htn (on file with University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
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Most Tribal Members employed by a Tribe are ingrained in the
community. Many were born and raised in the community. They
typically have several generations of relatives living in the area. The
adult employees of a Tribe likely grew up with the members of the
Tribal Council and may themselves be former or future Tribal
Council Members. They know each other intimately: their
strengths and weaknesses, their relations, and their "skeletons." In
many ways, the situation is no different from a small town where
the chief of city police is the wife of the vice-chairman of the city
council and the first cousin of the town mayor.
There are incredible advantages to such close-knit circum-
stances. Tribal Members live and grow up together. They work
together and they either stand or fall together. The Tribal Council
and the front-line employees realize almost instantly the impact
that their decisions have on the community. When a Tribal Mem-
ber makes a decision, it is his or her neighbor that will ask for a
justification the next day. Tribal policy-makers must make decisions
concerning local issues such as sewage and snowplowing, economic
development issues such as the viability of developing land for a
casino or an industrial park, and big picture issues such as lobbying
Congress to devote more funds to all Tribes and to strike down
anti-Tribe legislation proposed yearly. It is likely that no other gov-
ernment with as much responsibility as a Tribal government is as
accountable to its constituents.
38
Contrast a Tribal government employer to a large corporate
board of directors. A Tribal government employer must continually
justify itself to its employees, many of whom will vote periodically in
Tribal Council elections. A corporate board of directors may have
to respond to thousands of shareholders, but few of these share-
holders will be able to successfully pierce the corporate veil or
force a board to be more accountable. 9 Most often, members of a
board of directors will not have to go home to the same neighbor-
hood as their front-line employees, or even the same city or state if
the corporation is large enough.4" Tribes exist to provide a conduit
38. Cf Raymond Cross, Tribes as Rich Nations, 79 OR. L. REV. 893, 975 (2000) (noting
that tribal constituencies routinely confront tribal government on a variety of levels).
39. See generallyJEssE H. CHOPER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 254
(5th ed. 2000) (describing the piercing of the corporate veil as "complex"); William O.
Douglas & Carroll M. Shanks, Insulation From Liability Through Subsidiary Corporations, 39 YALE
L. J. 193, 193 (1929) (noting that "the desire for limited liability has played its part in in-
creasing the use of the corporate device").
40. See generally Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase Its Prof-
its, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 13, 1970 (Magazine at 33) (arguing that corporate executives must "act
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for direct governmental services to Members, services such as hous-
ing, health care, education, social services, and even employment.
Meanwhile, corporations exist to make a profit. The United States
Congress enacted the Fair Labor Standards Act,4' the Indian Civil
Rights Act of 1968,42 the National Labor Relations Act,43 and other
remedial pro-employee statues because corporations and other
employers are not accountable to their employees and cannot be
trusted, on the whole, to treat employees fairly.44 While some critics
complain that Tribes do not have adequate labor laws or employ-
ment protection laws,45 there is a remedy in place. If Tribal Council
Members victimize employees, they can expect to be removed from
the political process.46
B. Employment of Non-Members
Indian Tribes also employ increasing numbers of non-Tribal
Members. 47 Many of these non-Tribal Members are Indians from
other Indian Tribes who have married into the community or who
have became part of the community in some other way.48 However,
a significant number of these employees are non-Indians.49 As
tribal governments grow, fueled by federal and state grants and
funding and by improving tribal business enterprises, many tribes
in some way that is not in the interest of his employees"), reprinted in CHOPER ET AL., SUpra
note 39, at 37.
41. See 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq. (2000).
42. See 25 U.S.C. § 1301 etseq. (2000).
43. See 29 U.S.C § 151 et seq. (2000).
44. See, e.g., HOWARD ZINN, THE POLITICS OF HISTORY (Beacon Press 1970).
45. See Scott D. Danahy, License to Discriminate: The Application of Sovereign Immunity to
Employment Discrimination Claims Brought By Non-Native American Employees of Tribally Owned
Businesses, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 679 (1998).
46. E.g., Kinslow v. Bus. Comm. of the Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla.,
15 Indian L. Rptr. 6007, 6009 (Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla. Sup. Ct. Feb.
17, 1988) (discussing removal of Tribal Council Vice-Chairman for allegedly "intimidating a
tribal security guard"); In re Reyn Leno, 27 Indian L. Rptr. 6213, 6213-14 (Confederated
Tribes of Grand Ronde Cmty. of Or. Tribal Ct. May 12, 2000) (discussing Tribal Council
Vice-Chairman's removal from Council due to his intimidation, threatening, and coercing of
Tribal employees).
47. See Brief of Amici Curiae Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians et al.
at 15-16, Taxpayers of Mich. Against Casinos v. State, 685 N.W.2d 221 (Mich. 2004)
(No. 122830), available at http://courts.michigan.gov/supremecourt/Clerk/03-04/122830/
122830-Amicus-GrTraverse.pdf (on file with University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
48. See L. Scott Gould, The Congressional Response to Duro v. Reina: Compromising Sover-
eignty and the Constitution, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 53, 59 (1994).
49. E.g., Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians v. United States Att'y for
the W. Dist. of Mich., 198 F. Supp. 2d 920, 926 (W.D. Mich. 2002), aff'd, 369 F.3d 960 (6th
Cir. 2004).
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simply do not have enough Tribal Members to fill all of their em-
ployment slots.50 Tribal government jobs are usually better jobs
than those that private employers offer. In the author's experi-
ence, Tribal employees maintain better relationships with co-
workers and the employer.
In spite of the generally positive working relationship between
Tribal employers and their employees, the rise in non-Indian em-
ployment creates legal problems in the application of employment
law such as jurisdiction, choice of law, and legal procedure. Tribes
applying the law presented by the dominant society may create in-
equities. For example, federal law often treats Tribal Members,
non-Tribal Members, and non-Indians differently.52 Some Tribal
Courts have concerns that Tribes might treat non-Member or non-
Indian employees differently than Tribal Member employees. One
court wrote:
If we are to develop a good system for tribal members who are
employees of the Tribe, the system must provide for all em-
ployees. Justice must be blind to the membership/non-
membership, Indian/non-Indian identity status of those who
apply to the tribal courts for relief."
C. Tribal Government Employment
Not only is it analogous in some ways to a corporate board of di-
rectors, but Tribal government employment also has many of the
same characteristics of employment in federal, state, or local gov-
ernment. The chief similarity, for the purposes of this Article, is
50. See generally Gabriel S. Galanda, Reservations of Right: A Practitioner's Guide to Indian
Law, THE BRIEF, Fall 2002, at 64.
51. See Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians, 198 F Supp. 2d at 924 ("The
casino also provides some of the best employment opportunities in the region, and all of its
employees are eligible for health insurance benefits, disability benefits and 401(k) benefit
plans.").
52. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) (upholding Bureau of Indian Affairs
policy incorporating Indian preference in employment); Livingston v. Ewing, 455 F. Supp.
825 (D. N.M. 1978) (upholding state-owned museum policy of allowing tribal members to
sell goods on the property while excluding all others), affd, 601 E2d 1110 (10th Cir. 1979).
53. Sliger v. Stalmack, No. 99-10-490-CV, slip op. at 3 (decision on motion for summary
disposition) (Grand Traverse Band Tribal Ct. Dec. 8, 1999) (on file with University of Michi-
gan Journal of Law Reform), withdrawn on reh'g, No. 99-10-490-CV, slip op. at 4 (Grand
Traverse Band Tribal Ct. Feb. 14, 2000) (on file with University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform).
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that all four are governments subject to limitations in their ability
to deprive an individual of property without due process. At the
constitutional level, the Fifth Amendment constrains the federal
government's ability to terminate an individual's employment,
54
and the Fourteenth Amendment constrains states and localities.5
The Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA)16 and, often, Tribal constitu-
tions constrain the Tribes. As such, Tribal government employees
typically can be discharged only for 'just cause."57 "The term 'just
cause' is broad, and it encompasses a wide range of employer justi-
fications for adverse action."
5
D. Tribal Enterprise Employment
An exception to the general rule that Indian Tribe employees
may only be dismissed for 'Just cause" is employment with an In-
dian Tribe's economic development arm. Because it needs to
function effectively in the business world, the Tribal economic de-
velopment corporation "must be able to make sound business
decisions based solely upon business considerations. Many tribal
businesses will treaty employees as "at will" employees, whereas
most tribal governments treat employees as 'just cause" employees.
While at least one Tribal Court has asserted in dicta that the
failure to treat Tribal government employees and Tribal enterprise
employees the same may constitute an equal protection violation, 6
54. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
55. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
56. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-31 (2000).
57. E.g., Koon v. Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians, No.95-067-048-
CV, slip op. at 2 (Grand Traverse Band Tribal Ct. July 20, 2001) (on file with University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform) ("This Court finds that the Defendant had just cause to
terminate the employment of the Plaintiff...."); White v. Ho-Chunk Nation, 24 Indian L.
Rptr. 6182, 6185 (Ho-Chunk Nation Trial Ct. Oct. 14, 1996). Cf Safe Ride Services, Inc. v.
Todachine, 23 Indian L. Rptr. 6253, 6253-54 (Navajo Nation Sup. Ct. Aug. 28, 1996) (hold-
ing that termination of employment without just cause by an Arizona corporation doing
business on the reservation violated Tribal law).
58. Smith v. Red Mesa Unified School District No. 27, 22 Indian L. Rptr. 6104, 6106
(Navajo Nation Sup. Ct. May 25, 1995). See also Schwab v. CTEC, 21 Indian L. Rptr. 6027,
6028 (Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation Admin. Ct. Jan. 3, 1994) ("'For cause'
must be a cause related to [the employee's] ability to perform his job or a reduction in force
in order not to be arbitrary and capricious.").
59. Adams v. Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians Econ. Dev. Auth.,
No. 89-03-001-CV, slip op. at 1-2 (decision on motion to dismiss) (Grand Traverse Band
Tribal Ct. June 18, 1992) (on file with University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
60. See Rhode v. Garvin, No. CV 00-39, slip op. at 17 (Ho-Chunk Nation Trial Ct. Aug.
24, 2001), available at http://www.ho-chunknation.com/government/judicial/opinions/
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most Tribal courts view employment with a Tribal enterprise as
substantially different from employment with a Tribal government.
As such, following Tribal law, Tribal Courts will uphold the dis-
charge of Tribal enterprise employees whenever there is a rational
basis for the discharge. 61
II. THE PARADOX OF ANGLO-AMERICAN STRUCTURES DESIGNED
TO PROTECT TRIBAL EMPLOYEE RIGHTS
Tribal employment separation law develops differently in each
Tribe and Tribal organization. The Constitution or other govern-
ment documents, such as corporate charters, initiate the
development of employment separation law. Tribes and Tribal or-
ganizations generally have several mechanisms in place, such as
personnel policies, handbooks, and manuals-with widely varying
62provisions for employment within the different entities. 2 These
may or may not be expressly enacted or ratified by the Tribal
Council or the board or commission that oversees a Tribally char-
tered organization. Some Tribal Courts may order the Tribal
Rhode%20vs.%20Garvin%20CV00-39.pdf (on file with University of Michigan Journal of
Law Reform).
61. See Olderman v. Mashantuket Pequot Gaming Enter., 27 Indian L. Rptr. 6266, 6269
(Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ct. Ap. 30, 1999); Navarro v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming
Enter., 24 Indian L. Rptr. 6217, 6218-19 (Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ct. May 7, 1996);
O'Neal v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enter., 24 Indian L. Rptr. 6103, 6103-04 (Mashan-
tucket Pequot Tribal Ct. Mar. 7, 1996); Quattromani v. Brown, 24 Indian L. Rptr. 6080, 6081
(Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ct. July 31, 1995); Romano v. Brown, 24 Indian L. Rptr. 6082,
6082 (Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ct. July 5, 1995); Mitchell v. Brown, 23 Indian L. Rptr.
6215, 6218 (Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ct.July 5, 1995).
62. Cf, e.g., Cholka v. Ho-Chunk Gaming Comm'n, 23 Indian L. Rptr. 6075, 6078 (Ho-
Chunk Nation Trial Ct. Feb. 5, 1996) (ordering the gaming commission to distribute its
gaming ordinance to gaming employees). Some Tribal Courts are agnostic on the subject of
personnel manuals. One court wrote:
In order to serve this tribal community, the Court must be able to do justice, even
when parties can not afford attorney representation. That goal is nowhere more ap-
parent, than in cases like the instant one, where 'the deck may be stacked' in favor of
the Tribe by its own design. The Tribe has drafted the Personnel Policy and always
has attorney representation. Design principles of good government provide counter-
balance through a system of 'checks and balances'. There must be protections against
the abuse of power.
Sliger v. Stalmack, No. 99-10-490-CV, slip op. at 3 (decision on motion for summary disposi-
tion) (Grand Traverse Band Tribal Ct. Dec. 8, 1999) (on file with University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform), withdrawn on reh'g, No. 99-10-490-CV, slip op. at 4 (Grand Traverse
Band Tribal Ct. Feb. 14, 2000) (on file with University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
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government to publish a personnel handbook containing objective
personnel policies.3 Other Tribes may already have employment
separation statutes enacted by the Tribe's legislature. Most Tribes
have Tribal Courts, while some Tribes, generally very small ones,
utilize the Tribal Council as the judicial decision-maker.
A. Anglo-American Model of Government
Employee Separations
Simply put, under federal law, due process requires notice and
an opportunity to be heard.6 The classic description of the factors
that determine what process is due under the federal constitution
is contained in Mathews v. Eldridg e
65
[I]dentification of the specific dictates of due process gener-
ally requires consideration of three distinct factors: First, the
private interest that will be affected by the official action; sec-
ond, the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any,
of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally,
the Government's interest ....
The most critical and persuasive United States Supreme Court
case in the area of government employee termination rights is
Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill.7 In Loudermill, the Su-
preme Court detailed the analysis for determining whether the
termination process afforded a governmental employee was ade-
quate. First, the Court held, the government employee must show
that she had a reasonable expectation of continued employment
such that the expectation could constitute a form of property.68
Second, if there was a property interest, then the government
"could not deprive [her] of this property without due process."69 As
the Court explained, the "root requirement" of due process is that
63. E.g., Strickland v. DeCouteau, 31 Indian L. Rptr. 6021, 6021 (Turtle Mountain
Tribal Ct. Nov. 25, 2003).
64. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313-14 (1949).
65. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
66. Id. at 335.
67. 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
68. See id. at 538.
69. See id (citing Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1978);
Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 573-74 (1975)).
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"an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing .... "7 0 What is
adequate under this "pre-deprivation" or "pre-termination" hearing
standard is unclear, only that "some kind of hearing" suitable to the
circumstances be available.71 As the Court wrote, "In general, 'some-
thing less' than a full evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to
adverse administrative action."72 This pre-termination hearing is re-
quired as "an initial check against mistaken decisions-essentially, a
determination of whether there are reasonable grounds to believe
that the charges against the employee are true and support the
proposed action. "" Finally, the Court held that at the pre-
termination hearing, each "tenured public employee is entitled to
oral or written notice of the charges against him, an explanation of
the employer's evidence, and an opportunity to present his side of
the story."74 As long as a post-termination forum is available,75 the
Loudermill criteria are all that is required of the government em-
ployer prior to termination.
The Loudermill Court applied the Mathews v. Eldridge test and
based its decision on numerous factors, weighing the interests of
both the employee and the employer. In making its decision, the
Court discussed several underlying factors and policy considera-
tions. First, retention of employment is a critical right. "While a
fired worker may find employment elsewhere, doing so will take
some time and is likely to be burdened by the questionable cir-
cumstances under which he left his previous job. 76 Second, both
the employee and the employer have an interest in ensuring that
the factual predicate for the dismissal is valid. With an opportunity
to tell her side of the story, an employee may compel the employer
to reconsider "the appropriateness or necessity of the discharge."77
Third, the government has an interest in keeping a qualified em-
ployee on rather than training a new one.7 ' Finally, and perhaps
most importantly for Tribal governments, "[a] governmental em-
ployer also has an interest in keeping citizens usefully employed
70. Id. at 542 (quoting Boddie v. Conn., 401 U.S. 371, 379 (1971)).
71. See id. (citing Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972)).
72. Id. at 545 (quoting Mathews v. Eldgridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343 (1976)).
73. Id. (citing Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 540 (1971)).
74. Id. at 546 (citing Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 170-71 (1974) (Powell,J.)).
75. Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545-56. See generally Gilbert v. Homar, 520 U.S. 924, 935
(1997) (discussing need for post-deprivation hearing).
76. Loudermil, 470 U.S. at 543 (citing Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70, 83-84 (1973)).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 544.
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rather than taking the possibly erroneous and counterproductive
step of forcing its employees onto the welfare rolls."79
B. Adopting the Loudermill Formulation
With few exceptions, Indian Tribes experience excessive diffi-
culty with employment separations. Most Tribal governments are
relatively new and inexperienced. In an early opinion of the fledg-
ling Grand Traverse Band Tribal Court, long-time Chief Judge
Michael Petoskey described the growth of the Grand Traverse
Band:
It is particularly instructive at the beginning [of] this decision
to reflect upon the general course of conduct by tribal gov-
ernment .... In fact, it is a product of the Tribal Constitution
that was adopted by tribal membership early in 1988, which
was only four years ago. The federal government ignored the
sovereign status of the Tribe from the treaty days until federal
recognition in May of 1980. After recognition in 1980 and
prior to the 1988 Constitution, an interim Tribal Council car-
ried out most governmental activity. Prior to May 1980 few
community resources were available to fund governmental ac-
tivity. These realities give substance to a backdrop that
provides the appropriate context in which to view the facts
that give rise to the matter in controversy here. That backdrop
makes it clear that the government of the Grand Traverse
Band is new and in the process of development. Our new gov-
ernment is much more reactive than proactive. It engages in
activities that gain their primary priority because they are of
immediate concern or consequence. Tribal government is in
its earliest stages of development. It is incomplete and inexpe-
rienced. History has not yet provided many lessons. This is the
context of the present case.8O
Judge Petoskey also had occasion to write about the even newer
Tribal government at the Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indi-
ans:
79. Id
80. Adams v. Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians Econ. Dev. Auth.,
No. 89-03-001-CV, slip op. at 2 (decision on motion to dismiss) (Grand Traverse Band Tribal
Ct.June 18, 1992) (on file with University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
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From the outset, it should be noted that the Little Traverse Bay
Bands tribal government is in an early stage of development.
During this early stage, there will be many challenges faced by
the community and its government. Among such challenges
are the following: the lack of a clear understanding and defini-
tion about the appropriate roles and authority of various
governmental institutions; the lack of a fully-developed gov-
ernment and service infrastructure, including the express
adoption of rules, policies and procedures; and the lack of ex-
perience and training of various officials and staff These
challenges, in particular, contribute to the community learn-
ing from its experiences, conflicts and mistakes. None of this
should be unexpected. After all, this exercise of tribal self-
government by the community is relatively new. It is said that
"one who makes no mistakes is doing nothing" and that "the
price of unwillingness to take any risk because there is fear of
making a mistake is to do nothing." All of us must have empa-
thy and patience for each other, as we engage in the
development of tribal community and its government. We will
make mistakes along the way. The important thing is that we
strive to not make mistakes, and that we learn from them
when they are made.1
Personnel decisions are extremely complicated in any context,
but in a Tribal government and Tribal community context where so
many people are related to each other and because tribal employ-
ers are relatively inexperienced in personnel decisionmaking, they
are next to impossible to make faultlessly. Mistakes will be made.
Personnel matters are a fundamental element of running a Tribal
government and cannot be escaped entirely, only minimized. Con-
sequently, personnel matters tend to appear again and again in
Tribal Courts. Just as state courts are inundated with criminal drug
cases and federal courts are inundated with prisoner tort cases and
habeas petitions, Tribal Courts are inundated with personnel cases.
Many tribal courts adopt Loudernilts principles. As such, Tribal
employment separation cases generally go through two stages-the
administrative hearing stage and the Tribal Court stage. Part C dis-
cusses the procedures and issues involved with these two levels of
review.
81. Naganshe v. Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians Election Bd., No. C-017-
0599, slip op. at 1-2 (Little Traverse Bay Bands Tribal Ct. June 18, 1999) (on file with Uni-
versity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
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C. Pre-Termination Hearing-Administrative Review
Mirroring federal and state public employment law, Tribal gov-
ernments are constrained by due process protections and other
constitutional rights protections. As such, prior to finalizing an
employment termination, Tribal governments usually provide pre-
or post-termination due process in the form of a hearing.13 In some
instances, the Tribal Court finds that the Indian Civil Rights Act
requires a hearing. 4 In other instances, even where the Tribal gov-
ernment has eliminated any administrative review process, a Tribal
Court might find that it must stand in the place of an administra-
tive review panel.85
82. See Synowski v. Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde, No. C-00-11-003, slip op. at
5-6 (Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde Cmty. of Or. Tribal Ct. Oct. 3, 2001) (citing
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985)), available at http://
www.grandronde.org/court/PublishedOpinions/SynLewRam.PDF (on file with University
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), affrd, No. A-01-10-001 (Confederated Tribes of Grand
Ronde Cmty. of Or. Ct. App. Jan. 22, 2002), available at http://www.grandronde.org/court/
PublishedOpinions/SynowskiAppeal.PDF (on file with University of Michigan Journal of
Law Reform); Baker v. Spirit Mountain Casino, 28 Indian L. Rptr. 6079, 6080 (Confederated
Tribes of Grand Ronde Cmty. of Or. Tribal Ct. Sept. 28, 2000); Johnson v. Mashantucket
Pequot Gaming Enter., No. MPTC-EA-95-136 at 37, 42 (Mashantucket Pequot Tribal
Ct. Dec. 11, 1995), available at www.tribalresourcecenter.org/opinions/opfolder/
1995.NAMP.0000026.htm (on file with University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (cit-
ing Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 538), aff'd, 25 Indian L. Rptr. 6011 (Mashantucket Pequot Ct.
App.June 11, 1996).
83. E.g., McFall v. Victories Casino, No. A-002-1102, slip op. at 1 (Little Traverse Bay
Bands Ct. App, June 9, 2003) (on file with University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform)
(discussing employee's recourse to the Victories Casino Grievance Panel); Hoopa Valley
Indian Hous. Auth. v. Gerstner, 22 Indian L. Rptr. 6002, 6004-05 (Hoopa Valley Ct. App.
Sept. 27, 1993) (discussing employee's recourse to the Tribal Employee Rights Ordinance
Commission); Fall v. Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians, No. 03-04-308-CV,
slip op. at 1 (ruling on motion to dismiss) (Grand Traverse Band Tribal Ct. June 26, 2003)
(on file with University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (discussing employee's re-
course to Administrative Appeals Board); Baker v. Spirit Mountain Casino, 28 Indian L. Rptr.
6079, 6080 (Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde Cmty. of Or. Tribal Ct. Sept. 28, 2000)
(discussing employee's recourse to Internal Review Board); Johnson v. Mashantucket Pequot
Gaming Enter., No. MPTC-EA-95-136 at 14 (Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ct., Dec. 11,
1995) (discussing employee's recourse to the "Board of Review").
84. E.g., Regan v. Funkbonner, 21 Indian L. Rptr. 6026, 6026 (Nooksack Ct. App. Feb.
15, 1990). Cf Koon v. Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians, No. 95-07-048-
CV, slip op. at 3 (decision on summary disposition) (Grand Traverse Band Tribal Ct. Aug.
31, 1996) (on file with University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (holding that the
Tribe must provide "the complete administrative record, along with administrative structure
and process documents" to the plaintiff and the court).
85. See McFall v. Victories Casino, No. A-002-1102, slip op. at 7-8 (Little Traverse Bay
Bands Ct. App. June 9, 2003) (on file with University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
Cf Baker v. Rosebud Sioux Headstart Program, 25 Indian L. Rptr. 6150, 6151-52 (Rosebud
Sioux Tribal Ct. Mar. 25, 1998) (holding that Tribal Court must sit as the administrative body
for worker's compensation claims).
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Typically, Tribal Courts require petitioners to exhaust any avail-
able administrative remedies. Tribal Courts desire the benefit of an
administrative record and expertise. Exhaustion ensures judicial
efficiency by making sure that managers can attempt to use their
specialized skills to resolve the problem before a court considers
the controversy."6 Without a requirement of exhaustion, complain-
ants would be encouraged "to concoct claims outside the [statute],
in an attempt to circumvent the administrative process. ,8 With
those concerns in mind, some courts have adopted the require-
ment that the employee petitioner must exhaust her administrative
remedies or else the "attendant waiver" rules kicks in."" Other
courts have administered the principle by requiring exhaustion of
administrative remedies as a prerequisite to a waiver of a Tribe's
immunity.8 9 However, where the Tribal government turns a "deaf
86. Hawkins v. Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians, No. 98-04-148-CV,
slip op. at 1 (decision on motion for summary disposition) (Grand Traverse Band Tribal Ct.
Feb. 7, 2000) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). See also
Charles v. Furniture Warehouse, 21 Indian L. Rptr. 6103, 6104 (Navajo Nation Sup. Ct. July
12, 1994) (arguing that "judicial efficiency and economy" are significant factors); Ponca
Tribal Election Bd. v. Snake, 17 Indian L. Rptr. 6085, 6091 (Court of Indian Appeals for
Ponca Tribe Nov. 10, 1988) ("There are sound policy reasons for this requirement, namely
the availability of an inexpensive and more speedy resolution of disputes for the parties, and
the preservation ofjudicial resources where forums already exist to decide the case.").
87. Charles, 21 Indian L. Rptr. at 6104.
88. E.g., Grinnell v. Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde, No. C-02-11-002, at 1-2
(Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde Tribal Ct. April 15, 2003), available at http://
www.grandronde.org/court/PublishedOpinions/Grinnell-041503.pdf (on file with the Uni-
versity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); Charles, 21 Indian L. Rptr. at 6103-04; Hawkins,
No. 98-04-148-CV at 1; Healy v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enter., 26 Indian L. Rptr.
6069, 6069 (Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ct. Sept. 3, 1998); Koon v. Grand Traverse Band of
Ottawa & Chippewa Indians, No. 95-07-048-CV, slip op. at 3 (decision on summary disposi-
tion) (Grand Traverse Band Tribal Ct. Feb. 3, 1998) (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform); Koon v. Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians, No.
95007-048-CV, slip op. at 2 (decision on summary disposition) (Grand Traverse Band Tribal
Ct. Aug. 31, 1996) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); Woods v.
Gillette, 25 Indian L. Rptr. 6035, 6036 (Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation
Dist. Ct. Sept. 23, 1997); Simplot v. Ho-Chunk Nation Dept. of Health, 23 Indian L. Rptr.
6235, 6239 (Ho-Chunk Nation Trial Ct. Aug. 29, 1996); Horton v. Brown, 24 Indian L. Rptr.
6151, 6151 (Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ct. Mar. 28, 1996); Kendall v. Brown, 24 Indian L.
Rptr. 6025, 6025 (Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ct. May 1, 1995).
89. E.g., Raymond v. Navajo Ag. Prod. Indus., 22 Indian L. Rptr. 6100, 6100-01 (Navajo
Nation Sup. Ct. July 20, 1995); Henry v. Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde Cmty. of Or.,
No. C-02-08-005, slip op. at 4-5 (Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde Cmty. of Or. Tribal
Ct. April 14, 2003), available at http://www.grandronde.org/court/PublishedOpinions/
Henry-TomOpinion04.PDF (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform);
Jones v. Mashantucet Pequot Gaming Enter., 26 Indian L. Rptr. 6129, 6131 (Mashantucket
Pequot Tribal Ct. Aug. 4, 1998). Cf Weber v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enter., 27 Indian
L. Rptr. 6026, 6027 (Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ct. Aug. 27, 1998) (holding that Tribe's
sovereign immunity precluded court from allowing employee to miss filing deadlines); Jeffs
v. Brown, 25 Indian L. Rptr. 6009, 6010 (Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ct.July 15, 1996).
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ear" to an employee's attempts to utilize her administrative reme-
dies, a Tribal Court will deem the requirement waived. 90
1. Tribal Constitutional Protections and the Indian Civil Rights Act-
The Indian Civil Rights Act ("ICRA") requires that Tribal govern-
ments provide due process of law before taking a person's
property.9' ICRA's "legislative history reflects that Congress care-
fully balanced the desire to protect the rights of Native Americans
with the desire to avoid extensive interference with internal tribal
affairs."" Congress's intent in enacting ICRA was to require Indian
tribes alone to determine "the purpose of the ICRA provisions,
their definitions and how they apply to [the] tribe."93 Many tribal
courts, interpreting ICRA's due process clause in the context of the
traditional, customary, and non-Indian concepts of due process,
require Tribes to offer an administrative proceeding of varying de-
tail to an employee about to be discharged or who has already
been discharged.
In Hoopa Valley Indian Housing Authority v. Gerstner, for example,
the court acknowledged that due process under the United States
Constitution and due process under the Indian Civil Rights Act are
"construed to be the same."94 Other tribal courts allow for a differ-
ing interpretation of due process rights. One tribal court follows a
principle that, only where no tribal "custom or tradition has been
argued to be implicated.... [tribal courts] will look to general
U.S. constitutional principles, as articulated by federal ... courts,
for guidance ....
2. Tribal Court Due Process Formulations-Tribal Courts often fol-
low the Mathews v. Eldridge6 approach to due process analysis,
which requires notice and an opportunity to be heard.
90. E.g., Simplot v. Ho-Chunk Nation Dept. of Health, 23 Indian L. Rptr. 6235, 6240
(Ho-Chunk Nation Trial Ct. Aug. 29, 1996).
91. See 25 U.S.C. § 1302(8) (2000) ("No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-
government shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its
laws or deprive any person of liberty or property without due process of law.").
92. United States v. Doherty, 126 E3d 769, 779 (6th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 524 U.S. 917
(1998).
93. Palencia v. Pojoaque, 28 Indian L. Rptr. 6149, 6152 (Pueblo of Pojoaque Tribal Ct.
Apr. 17, 2001) (citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978)).
94. Hoopa Valley Indian Hous. Auth. v. Gerstner, 22 Indian L. Rptr. 6002, 6005
(Hoopa Valley Ct. App. Sept. 27, 1993) (citing Red Fox v. Red Fox, 564 F.2d 361, 364 (9th
Cir. 1977)).
95. Louchart v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enter., 27 Indian L. Rptr. 6176, 6179
(Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ct. 1999).
96. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See also In iv Leno, 27 Indian L. Rptr. 6213, 6215 (Confeder-
ated Tribes of Grand Ronde Cmty. of Or. Tribal Ct. May 12, 2000); Short v. Powell, 26 Indian
L. Rptr. 6098, 6099 (Hoopa Valley Tribal Ct. Aug. 28, 1996) (quoting Mathews v. Eldridge
test).
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The meaning of "notice" is well understood. "Due process only
requires notice that gives sufficient detail to allow an opposing
counsel to prepare a defense."97 In Smith v. Red Mesa Unified School
District No. 27,9' the Navajo Nation Supreme Court expounded in
great deal on the reasons for adequate notice:
The purposes of notice as an element of due process are to in-
form the individual of the basis for adverse action and to
allow that person to pursue legal remedies with an under-
standing of what facts the employee must address. If the
employee does not know why adverse action is taken, both
due process and the [Navajo Preference in Employment] Act
are violated. If, however, the employee knows the reasons for
the employer's action, in either the notice under the Act or
contemporaneous documents, then due process and the Act
are satisfied. The employee must, at minimum, be able to
point to written declarations by the employer which explain
the reasons for the adverse action taken.9
Tribal Courts characteristically require a "meaningful" opportu-
nity to be heard.'00 As one court explained, this opportunity
encompasses four minimum rights:
(1) adequate notice, (2) a hearing decision by [an] inde-
pendent arbiter, (3) an initial burden of proof imposed on
the employer, and (4) the right to confront and cross-
examine those witnesses used against the employer.'0 '
Following Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill,02 Tribal
Courts may also require a pre-termination opportunity to present a
defense.'03
97. Contreras v. Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde, 28 Indian L. Rptr. 6140, 6141
(Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde Cmty. of Or. Jan. 25, 2001) (citing Barnes v. Healy,
980 E2d 572, 579 (9th Cir. 1992)).
98. 22 Indian L. Rptr. 6104 (Navajo Nation Sup. Ct. May 25, 1995).
99. Id. at 6105-06.
100. E.g., Garvin v. Ho-Chunk Nation, No. CV 00-10, slip op. at 10 (Ho-Chunk Nation Trial
CL Nov. 16, 2001), available at http://www.ho-chunknation.com/government/judicial/
opinions/2003/Garvin%20v.%20HCN%20et%20al.,%20CVOO-10,%20-38.pdf (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
101. Hoopa Valley Indian Hous. Auth. v. Gerstner, 22 Indian L. Rptr. 6002, 6005
(Hoopa Valley Ct. App., Sept. 27, 1993).
102. 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
103. See Rhode v. Garvin, No. CV 00-39, slip op. at 16 (Ho-Chunk Nation Trial Ct. Aug.
24, 2001) (citing Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542), available at http://www.ho-chunknation.com/
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Tribal Courts may take this notion of due process or leave it as
they are free to interpret ICRA's due process clause in different
ways. Influenced by Loudermill, many Tribal Courts view pre-
termination hearings as critical for a variety of reasons. One Tribal
Court stated:
The Court has noted a few of the factors underlying the ne-
cessity of a pre-termination hearing, namely immediate loss of
income and the associated embarrassment and humiliation
flowing from severe employment discipline. Other factors in-
clude: the greater potential for accuracy in the employment
decision; the expected lapse of time before securing other
employment possibilities; the effect a questionable work re-
cord has on future employment possibilities; the inability to
fully commit to another employer during the pendency of the
individual's grievance/case; the resulting disruption to an in-
dividual's personal and economic life; the time needed to
ultimately resolve a grievance/complaint; and the potential
inability to collect unemployment compensation due to the
type of employment separation. [citations omitted] 1
04
Tribal Courts may also require the employer to explain, in the
written notice of termination, the employee's rights to appeal the
termination.'
Other Tribal Courts have had the opportunity to articulate views
of due process with other characteristics. In an administrative re-
view context, the Grand Traverse Band Tribal Court stated:
Fairness can be instilled in the process by requiring that:
(1)judicial discovery tools be made available to grievants;
(2) grievants be advised that they may be represented by
counsel at their own expense; and (3) grievants be given a
government/judicial/opinions/Rhode%20vs.%20Garvin%20CV00-39.pdf (on file with the
University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
104. Id. at 18. See also Miller v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enter., 26 Indian L. Rptr.
6143, 6144 (Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ct. Aug. 7, 1998) (quoting Bartless v. Krause, 209
Conn. 352, 372 (1988) (citing Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542)); Stone v. Swan, 19 Indian L. Rptr.
6093, 6094 (Colville Confederated Tribes Indian Reservation Tribal Ct. Apr. 15, 1992) (cit-
ing Louderi/).
105. See Gerstner, 22 Indian L. Rptr. at 6005; Mosqueda v. Colville Tribal Enter. Corp., 30
Indian L. Rptr. 6197, 6199 (Confederated Tribes of Colville Reservation Tribal Ct. Aug. 5,
2003); Wood v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enter., 25 Indian L. Rptr. 6015, 6017
(Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ct.June 25,1996).
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reasonable amount of time to secure the services of counsel if
they wish to be represented."6
Since Tribes make mistakes, often Tribal Courts are asked to an-
swer the question of whether a mistake constitutes reversible error.
The Mashantucket Pequot Court of Appeals described the circum-
stances when a mistake will constitute reversible error:
Some errors, however, implicate "constitutional rights so basic
to a fair trial that their infraction can never be treated as
harmless error." ... Where the most basic fairness and integ-
rity of the proceedings are involved, or where there has been
a significant deviation from constitutional rule or a specific
statutory requirement, plain error exists and reversal is auto-
matic.
1 0 7
This court held that an employee has no particular right as to
who makes the employment termination decision, even though the
employer's personnel policies specifies that a vice president with
no supervisory role over the employee must make the final deci-
sion. 10 Tribal Courts tend to follow a general rule: "Not all
procedural irregularities, however, require a reviewing court to set
aside an administrative decision; material prejudice to the com-
plaining party must first be shown."09 Generally, errors made at the
administrative, or pre-termination, hearing level can be "cured" by
the subsequent post-termination hearing."0 In most cases, employ-
ees are given adequate notice of their impending dismissal.111 One
Tribal Court, for example, held that the failure of the Tribe to pro-
vide a pre-termination written evaluation did not constitute a
violation of due process sufficient to justify reversal of the decision
106. Koon v. Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians, No. 95-07-048-CV,
slip op. at 3 (ruling on summary disposition) (Grand Traverse Band Tribal Ct. Feb. 3, 1998)
(on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
107. Grossi v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enter., 26 Indian L. Rptr. 6112 (Mashan-
tucket Pequot Ct. App. 1998) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967) and
Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764-65 (1946)). See also Louchart, 27 Indian L. Rptr.
at 6178 (citing Grossi, 26 Indian L. Rptr. at 6112).
108. See Eldred v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enter., 31 Indian L. Rptr. 6002, 6005
(Mashantucket Pequot Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2003).
109. Fickett v. Brown, 23 Indian L. Rptr. 6190, 6196 (Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ct.
Mar. 6, 1995) (citations omitted).
110. See Thompson v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe Board of Police Comm'rs, 23 Indian
L. Rptr. 6045, 6052-53 (Cheyenne River Sioux Ct. App. Feb. 9, 1996).
111. See, e.g., Creapeau v. Ho-Chunk Nation Rainbow Casino, 23 Indian L. Rptr. 6078,
6080 (Ho-Chunk Nation Trial Ct. Mar. 13, 1996).
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to discharge because the employee had actual notice of the reasons
why the tribe terminated his employment.11 2 Another Court found
harmless error where an employer's mistake benefited the com-
plaining employee. "
Nevertheless, Tribal Courts will reverse dismissals if the Tribal
employer fails to give adequate notice of actions that could result
in discharge.1 14 One Tribal Court awarded retroactive pay to an
employee who had not received a personnel evaluation as required
by the Tribal law.1 15 Another Tribal Court ruled in favor of an em-
ployee who had been discharged in accordance with a personnel
manual that the Tribe had never distributed to him.1 1 6 Tribal
Courts will not hesitate to reverse an employment discharge and
reinstate an employee where the Tribal employer violated its poli-
cies concerning drug testing.1 1 7 Tribal Courts will reverse a lay-off
112. See Short v. Hoopa Health Ass'n, No. A-99-008, slip op. at 4-5 (Hoopa Valley Tribal
Sup. Ct. Aug. 15, 2001) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform)
(citing Hoopa Valley Indian Hous. Auth. v. Gersmer, 22 Indian L. Rptr. 6002, 6005-07
(Hoopa Valley Ct. App. Sept. 27, 1993)).
113. See Shippentower v. Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Res. of Or., 20 In-
dian L. Rptr. 6026, 6027 (Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Indian Res. of Or. Tribal Ct.
Jan. 27, 1993). Some Tribal Courts would extend the concept of due process beyond process
to outcomes, believing that due process requires "fundamental fairness in all tribal actions.
Atcitty v. Dist. Ct. for the Judicial Dist. of Window Rock, 24 Indian L. Rptr. 6013, 6014 (Na-
vajo Nation Sup. Ct. Oct. 16, 1996) (citation omitted). The Atcitty Court noted that "[t]hese
due process protections are similar to those applied by American courts and are concerned
with equality in process and not of outcome." Id. However, in the area of government enti-
tlements and benefits, "[t]raditional Navajo due process encompasses a wider zone of
interest than general American due process. In cases concerning entitlement to governmen-
tal benefits, Navajo due process protections would extend to outcome, making it very
relevant." Id. In Atcitty, sovereign immunity did not bar a suit by Tribal Members against
theh Tribe to preserve government entitlements because of their due process rights. Id.
While it is unlikely that most Tribal Courts would adopt such a reading of their due process
protections in an employment context, each Tribe may interpret its own due process protec-
tions.
114. See, e.g., Brooks v. Yellow Cloud Residential Ctr., 23 Indian L. Rptr. 6035, 6035-36
(Colville Confederated Tribes Admin. Ct. Dec. 27, 1995); Simplot v. Ho-Chunk Nation Dep't
of Health, 23 Indian L. Rptr. 6235, 6241 (Ho-Chunk Nation Trial Ct. Aug. 29, 1996); Oglala
Sioux Tribal Pers. Bd. v. Red Shirt, 16 Indian L. Rptr. 6054, 6054 (Oglala Sioux Ct. App. June
27, 1985).
115. Frogg v. Ho-Chunk Casino, 23 Indian L. Rptr. 6197, 6199 (Ho-Chunk Nation Tribal
Trial Ct. Mar. 15, 1996).
116. Schwab v. CTEC Construction, 21 Indian L. Rptr. 6027, 6028 (Colville Confeder-
ated Tribes Admin. Ct. Jan. 3, 1994).
117. E.g., Strickland v. Decouteau, 31 Indian L. Rptr. 6021, 6021 (Turtle Mountain
Tribal Ct. Nov. 25, 2003); Gourd v. Robertson, 28 Indian L. Rptr. 6047, 6049 (Spirit Lake
Tribal Ct. Jan. 24, 2001); cf Tonasket v. Cipp, 20 Indian L. Rptr. 6125, 6125 (Colville Con-
federated Tribes Admin. Ct. Nov. 29, 1992) (holding that employer's proper adherence to its
drug policy to enhance worker safety outweighed employee's right to privacy).
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where the Tribal employer based its decision on aspects of the em-
ployee's ability of which the employer had never notified her."8
One of the more interesting aspects of Tribal employment sepa-
ration law is the adjudication of several novel defenses. One
defense, presumably based on some sort of due process claim, is
that an employee should be allowed a sort of "get out of jail free
card" where other employees have not been punished for bad
conduct and the appealing employee had been discharged. One
Tribal Court dismissed that claim, noting that where an employer
"tolerated some [poor] conduct in the past, that past benign ne-
glect did not entitle [the employee] or anyone else to assume that
policy (or lack of any policy] would continue."'' 9 Another em-
ployee's defense turned on her supervisor's subjective state of
mind at the time of the infraction as to its severity.
3. Different Systems and Elements of Administrative Review-Many
Tribes use the administrative review panel as a mechanism to pro-
vide the initial process due to the employee about to be
discharged. Typically, the Tribal Council adopts legislation creating
the panel with a set of basic rules, e.g., qualifications and number
of panel members, standard of review of the decision, and so on.
Often, the Tribal Council's legal department staff is required to
draft and finalize specific rules and procedures that the panel and
the parties must follow. Important provisions are discussed here.
a. Attorney Participation: Pros and Cons-Tribes and tribal courts
struggle over the advantages and disadvantages of allowing em-
ployees to use outside attorneys in the administrative review
setting. In the author's experience, most tribal employers view the
addition of an outside attorney in an informal, administrative pro-
ceeding as increasing the likelihood of creating an ugly, adversarial
dispute. Nevertheless, tribal courts are likely to find that denying
an employee access to an attorney at the administrative review
stage violates the tribe's constitution.
The presence of attorneys changes an administrative review
hearing from an informal hearing to a more formal adjudicatory
118. See generally Kelty v. Pettibone, 27 Indian L. Rptr. 6006, 6007-08 (Ho-Chunk Nation
Sup. Ct. July 27, 2000) (requiring notice of layoff factors to allow the employee to challenge
the layoff).
119. Robertson v. Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde, No. C-03-01-003, slip op. at
5 (Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde Cmty. of Or. Tribal Ct. June 27, 2003), available
at http://www.grandronde.org/court/PublishedOpinions/robertson-opinion.pdf (on file
with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
120. Appellant v. Holder, 24 Indian L. Rptr. 6143, 6145 (Colville Confederated Tribes
Admin. Ct. Feb. 27, 1997).
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hearing, complete with argumentative exchanges, a perceptible
feeling of intimidation for the non-lawyers in the room, and an in-
crease in the time necessary to complete the hearing. Non-lawyers
are often called upon to adjudicate employment separations, often
at short notice. Times and dates are constantly changing to meet
the scheduling demands of the lawyers involved, especially outside
lawyers. Once the hearing does begin, the non-lawyer panel must
decide often difficult evidentiary and procedural questions. The
employer's lawyer, typically the individual who created the hearing
procedure from scratch before it was approved by the employer,
will be hard-pressed to remain silent in instances where the panel
seems to be misinterpreting the procedure. The panel, not under-
standing the lawyer's conflict of interest, may seek a legal opinion
from that lawyer on numerous questions. The employee's attorney
may view the whole process as a sham.
In a typical hearing, the employee's attorney intimidates the
panel, the Tribe's attorney intimidates the employee, and the wit-
nesses sitting outside the room are scared to death. Very likely, the
hearing will continue that way, with both attorneys wrangling with
each other, fighting over who gets to have the most authority over
the panel. Unfortunately, many employees do not have the money
to hire an attorney and few private attorneys will work in Indian
Country without a massive retainer. As such, many hearings in
which attorneys may participate are completely lopsided, with the
Tribe having its own attorney represent management and the em-
ployee sitting alone.
Some Tribes have procedural rules that limit these types of ex-
changes.' Often, the Tribal Council restricts attorney participation
because of complaints by panelists and employees that attorneys
dominate the proceedings, make the hearing last too long, and
turn the whole procedure into a shouting match. However, doing
so may create serious due process concerns.122
Often, employees are not comfortable standing up before a
panel of decision-makers, their former supervisor, witnesses, and
121. See generally Synowski v. Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde, No. A-01-10-001, slip
op. at 5-8 (Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde Cmty. of Or. Ct. App. Jan. 22, 2002)
(discussing tribe's limitation on attorney participation), available at http://
www.grandronde.org/court/PublishedOpinions/SynowskiAppeal.PDF (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
122. E.g., id. at 8-9 (holding that the Tribe's prohibition on attorney representation vio-
lated the employee's due process rights as articulated in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
335 (1976)); Koon v. Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians, No. 95-07-048-
CV, slip op. at 3 (ruling on summary disposition) (Grand Traverse Band Tribal Ct. Feb. 3,
1998) (holding that fairness requires the Tribal government to allow the employee to be
represented by counsel) (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
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any person keeping the record-all of whom they may know from
the community-to argue and defend themselves. This is why peo-
ple hire a lawyer or ask a respected person from the community to
speak for them. Non-lawyers are more likely to freeze up before an
official, adjudicatory panel. And employees without a college de-
gree may be less likely to be able to articulate their thoughts in an
understandable manner. Usually, the Tribal Council restricts attor-
ney participation because of complaints by panelists and employees
that attorneys dominate the proceeding, make the hearing last too
long, and turn the procedure into a shouting match. However, no
matter how informal the hearing is supposed to be, it is an adver-
sary system and the parties most often will want legal counsel.
Two Tribal court cases accurately capture the conflicting inter-
ests at stake in administrative hearings. In Synowski v. Confederate
Tribes of Grand Ronde,'2 3 the Tribal Court strongly and persuasively
argued that no prohibition against attorney representation in an
administrative hearing can withstand constitutional attack. The
Synowski Court focused first on the importance of attorney repre-
sentation in the context of creating the administrative record:
[A] favorable record before the [administrative panel] ... is
critical to meaningful judicial review of the Tribe's employ-
ment decision. For many employees, creating such a record
simply will not be possible without the guiding hand of coun-
sel. Although the employee may retain an attorney once the
matter goes to court, by that time the record has been made
and there is little an attorney can do to change it. Given the
limited scope of judicial review of the Tribe's employment de-
cisions, the quality of the ... record may in many instances
determine the employee's success in the courts.
12 4
Likewise, in Johnson v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enterprise, the
Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Court noted that "[t] he creation of a
favorable record would require a plaintiff to be personally well
spoken, to have had the presence of mind to arrange, in advance
of the hearing, witnesses in his or her behalf, and to cross-examine
123. Synowski, No. A-01-01-001 at 5-6.
124. Id. at 6. See also Johnson v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enter., No. MPTG-EA-
95-136 at 47 (Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ct. Dec. 11, 1995), available at
www.tribalresourcecenter.org/opinions/opfolder/1995.NAMP.0000026.htm ("[Tihe estab-
lishment of a favorable record before the Board of Review is crucial to the success of the
plaintiff's appeal.") (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), affd,
25 Indian L. Rptr. 6011 (Mashantucket Pequot Ct. App.June 11, 1996).
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the [employer]'s representatives." 125 The court doubted that many
hourly employees could effectively communicate at such an ad-
vanced level.1
26
The Tribe in Synowski claimed that it had sought to "level the
playing field" for employees by keeping the attorneys out of the
room. The Synowski court rejected that claim as well:
As for the Tribe's desire to "provide a more level playing field"
for employees, we disagree with its contention that the [ad-
ministrative] hearing process is made more fair by reducing
every employee to the level of greatest disadvantage-i.e.,
proceeding without the assistance of counsel.... [T]he
Tribe's response-exclusion of all attorneys from [administra-
tive review] hearings-hardly made it fairer for the employees
as a whole; the new rule simply addressed the complaint of
those employees who could not afford an attorney. It is easily
argued that the better response to that complaint-in terms
of overall fairness-would have been a rule prohibiting the
participation of the Tribe's attorneys in cases where the em-
ployee is unrepresented. In sum, we give little weight to the
Tribe's interest in leveling the playing field.
2 7
However, the Synowski Court's suggestion to limit Tribal attorney
participation to instances where the employee is represented may
not be acceptable to many Tribal governments.128
The Court also disposed of the argument that the presence of
attorneys lengthens the hearings and renders them unnecessarily
complex:
Finally, the Tribe does not argue, and we do not believe, that
the participation of attorneys before the [administrative
panel] necessarily would lengthen the hearings or make them
more complex. In fact, attorneys may in many cases help to
streamline the process by narrowing the issues and ensuring
that only relevant evidence and argument are presented.
12 9
125. Johnson, No. MPTC-EA-95-136 at 49.
126. Id. at 50 (citation omitted).
127. Synowski, No. A-01-01-001 at 7.
128. In one instance, a Tribal government asserted that it had assigned a "coach" to as-
sist the employee in preparing her for the administrative hearing, but the court was unable
to reach a view of this novel solution because the evidence that such a "coach" was provided
failed to reach the record on appeal. See Baker v. Spirit Mountain Casino, 28 Indian L. Rptr.
6079, 6081 (Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde Cmty. of Or. Tribal Ct. Sept. 28, 2000).
129. Synowsk. No. A-01-01-001 at 8.
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The Johnson Court similarly rejected such a claim, emphatically
writing:
The defendant also complains that the Board of Review may
be led astray by legal counsel. The Court finds this to be a
specious argument. Juries, generally are wholly comprised of
lay persons, yet American society trusts the jury to make the
correct decision based on the evidence before it-despite be-
ing buffeted by the arguments of lawyers. Moreover, as Justice
Stevens dissenting in Walters [v. National Association of Radia-
tion Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985)] contended ".... there is no
reason to assume that lawyers would add confusion rather
than clarity to the proceedings. As a profession, lawyers are
skilled communicators dedicated to the service of their cli-
ents. Only if it assumed that the average lawyer is incompetent
or unscrupulous can one rationally conclude that the effi-
ciency of the [Gaming Enterprise's] work would be
undermined by allowing counsel to participate whenever [an
employee] is willing to pay for his [or her] services." Walters,
at 363. This Court, as well, "categorically reject[s] any such as-
sumption." Id.
1
3
0
Alternatively, tribes might allow for non-lawyer or lay advocates
to represent employees at the administrative review stage. The rea-
soning behind this provision might be that non-lawyers are less
likely to create the kind of adversarial exchanges that lawyers
would while providing employees a voice for their position. Never-
theless, allowance for lay advocates in the rules for administrative
hearings is not necessarily an improvement. One Tribal Court
noted that a lay advocate's commentary on the record before an
administrative hearing panel consisted of "repeated use of leading
questions, testifying by the spokesperson instead of through wit-
nesses, [and] 'editorializing' ... throughout the Transcript of
Proceedings."03
b. Hearing Officer-Some Tribes utilize a hearing officer.13 This
person, usually a lawyer, acts as the chair of the administrative
130. Johnson, No. MPTC-EA-95-136 at 152.
131. Hoopa Forest Indus. v. Jordan, 25 Indian L. Rptr. 6159, 6160 n. 4 (Hoopa Valley
Tribal Ct. Mar. 25, 1998).
132. See, e.g., Short v. Hoopa Health Ass'n, No. A-99-008, slip op. at 5 (Hoopa Valley
Tribal Sup. Ct. Aug. 15, 2001) (discussing the role of the hearing officer is conducting a
post-termination discharge hearing) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform); Contreras v. Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde, 28 Indian L. Rptr. 6140, 6141
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hearing panel and does not vote. The hearing officer handles all
questions about procedure, makes the attorneys and parties quiet
down when they become rowdy, and makes decisions about evi-
dence and testimony. In other words, the hearing officer is like the
administrative judge of the hearing panel. The presence of the
hearing officer alleviates many of the problems with having a panel
of non-lawyers. She keeps the decorum in the room constant and
provides legal counsel as needed by the panel.
133
Unfortunately, the hearing officer creates a separate set of prob-
lems. Often the only lawyer the panel may rely upon, she is likely to
exert an unusual amount of influence on the panel. She often may
lengthen the amount of time the hearing will last.134 Because she
has the capacity to act too much like a trial judge, she might, for
example, call a week-long recess of the proceedings to research
and write an opinion on the admissibility of documents produced
by the Tribe in its investigation of a sexual harassment complaint.
Naturally, both sides will want a few weeks to write and file briefs
on the question. The hearing languishes.
Moreover, the presence of a hearing officer may not resolve due
process concerns. For example, in Hoopa Forest Industries v. Jordan,
the presence of a hearing officer did nothing to prevent the admis-
sion of hearsay and irrelevant testimony. 5 Stating that it was the
"responsibility of the Hearings Officer to rule on admissibility of
evidence," 36 the Jordan Court noted that "[t] he transcript is replete
with irrelevant testimony as to how the alleged harassment effected
[sic] plaintiffs or witnesses' spouses."'37 Thus, though Tribes that
utilize hearing officers do so for the purpose of streamlining the
process, the apparent result is that the provision of a hearing offi-
cer simply adds another involved party to the mix without
improved efficiency.
c. Tribal Council or Employee Panel?-Most administrative hearing
panels that decide issues arising out of employment separations are
not composed of elected Tribal officials, but instead employees of
the Tribal government. In fact, the elected officials typically create
an administrative panel expressly to avoid having to decide em-
(Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde Cmty. of Or. Jan. 25, 2001) (discussing role of hear-
ing facilitator to limit arguments presented on federal law).
133. See Short, No. A-99-008 at 5 (affirming the discretion of the hearing officer to limit
oral argument on a particular issue before the hearing panel).
134. See, e.g., id. ("The extensive [appeal review panel] hearings took place over the
course of six days, with testimony from six witnesses.").
135. See Hoopa Forest Indus., 25 Indian L. Rptr. at 6160 n. 5.
136. Id. at 6161.
137. Id. at 6160 n. 5.
[VOL. 38:2
Tribal Employment Separation
ployee claims. In many Tribes, the early history of tribal govern-
ance is punctuated with clashes over employee separations.' At
times, these clashes become political 139 and, consequently, arbitrary
and capricious. °14 Tribal governments routinely deal with big pic-
ture questions such as land claims, treaty hunting and fishing
rights, 14' environmental protection initiatives,143 criminal and civil
jurisdictional boundaries, T4 regulatory, public safety, and law en-
forcement cooperation with local and state governments, 145 federal
and state legislation and regulations that may undermine tribal
initiatives, 46 and government revenue sources. 47 Personnel issues
are day-to-day questions that should not occupy the time of tribal
leaders who should be prioritizing important questions of tribal
governance.
138. The Mashantucket Pequot Nation, a newly recognized tribe, see 25 U.S.C. § 1758,
that operates the Foxwoods Casino and Resort in Connecticut, was forced to create a tribal
legal system to handle the influx of employment disputes arising out of the operation of its
casino. See How law was born: Indian affairs, THE ECONOMIST, April 15, 1995, at A27, available
at 1995 WL 9568834. The Indian Law Reporter, which collects opinions from tribal courts
nationwide, is inundated with employment dispute-related cases from the Mashantucket
Pequot Tribal Court system. E.g., Procaccino v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enter., 31
Indian L. Rptr. 6100 (Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ct., July 15, 2004); Barnes v. Mashan-
tucket Pequot Gaming Enter., 31 Indian L. Rptr. 6096 (Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ct. June
28, 2004); Dambach v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enter., 31 Indian L. Rptr. 6097
(Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ct., June 28, 2004);
139. See, e.g., Hoopa Valley Tribal Council v. Risling, 24 Indian L. Rptr. 6224, 6224-27
(Northwest Regional Tribal Sup. Ct. for the Hoopa Valley Ct. App. Feb. 20, 1996) (discuss-
ing claim by Tribal Council that former members of Tribal Council could not serve as
administrative employee grievance review panelists).
140. Cf Yellowbank v. Chingwa, No. C-018-0300, slip op. at 2 (Little Traverse Bay Bands
Tribal Ct., June 19, 2000) ("[A]lthough the Court can ensure fairness in tribal law and its
application, it cannot make politics fair.") (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of
Law Reform).
141. E.g., Oneida County v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York, 470 U.S. 226 (1985)
(discussing Tribal land claims).
142. E.g., Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172 (1999) (dis-
cussing Tribal hunting and fishing rights); Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger
Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658 (1979) (discussing Tribal fishing rights).
143. E.g., Montana v. Environmental Protection Agency, 137 E3d 1135 (9th Cir. 1998)
(discussing Tribal Clean Water Act regulations); City of Albuquerque v. Browner, 97 F.3d 415
(10th Cir. 1996) (discussing same).
144. E.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004) (discussing tribal court criminal ju-
risdiction); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001) (discussing tribal court civil jurisdiction).
145. E.g., Inyo County v. Paiute-Shoshone Indians of the Bishop Cmty. of the Bishop
Colony, 538 U.S. 701 (2003) (discussing lack of cooperation between state law enforcement
and tribal authorities).
146. E.g., Gobin v. Snohomish County, 304 F.3d 909 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing state at-
tempt to apply its land use regulations on reservation land), cert. denied, 538 U.S. 908 (2003).
147. E.g., Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 532 U.S. 645 (2001) (discussing tribal tax);
Prairie Band of Potawatomi Indians v. Wagnon, 276 F. Supp. 2d 1168 (D. Kan. 2003) (dis-
cussing tribal motor vehicle registration fees).
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In some Tribes, particularly those that have been federally rec-
ognized in the last decade and those that are very small, the
elected officials handle employee disputes as a function of their
executive authority. As Tribes develop, they tend to move quickly
toward an employee separation hearing mechanism that does not
include the elected officials. However, within some Tribes, a body
of elected officials may act as the review panel and is expected to
create and follow a set of written rules and procedures for the
hearing.'4s This legal structure has many problems and most tribal
courts review the decisions of these bodies with increasing skepti-
cism.
Regardless of the composition of the panel, conflicts of interest
arise frequently. Employees, especially if they are Tribal Members
or if they have married into the community, will be related in
interconnecting ways to many individuals in the community. These
individuals will invariably find themselves appointed or elected to
an employee review panel. Tribal decision-makers must deal with
questions as to how distant the relation must be before the panel
member may participate. In many Tribes, aunts and uncles are like
mothers and fathers, and second or third cousins are like
siblings. 49 People may live together without the formal sanction of
marriage. People may have grown up in the same house without
being formally related. Determining the limits of potential
nepotism and conflict of interest is extremely challenging for most
Tribes.' 50 Allowing parties to seek recusal by motion creates another
layer of litigation.151  Either method generates rational and
irrational questions about the legitimacy of the panel's decision.
5
1
148. E.g., Koon v. Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians, No. 95-07-048-
CV, slip op. at 4 (ruling on summary disposition) (Grand Traverse Band Tribal Ct. Feb. 3,
1998) (urging the Tribal government to develop a handbook for future administrative hear-
ings) (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
149. Indian tribes are not only governments, but they are also a social and familial or-
ganization held together by strong extended family relationships. SeeJAMES M. MCCLURKEN,
GAH-BAEH-JHAGWAH-BUK; THE WAY IT HAPPENED 112 (1991) (describing extended family
relationships at the Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians).
150. E.g., Dilkowski v. Marianito, 1 Navajo Rptr. 385, 1978.NANN.0000018 (Navajo
Nation App. Feb. 28, 1978), available at http://www.tribal-institute.org/opinions/
1978.NANN.0000018.htm (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
151. See, e.g., Greengrass v. Ho-Chunk Nation Election Board, 26 Indian L. Rptr. 6185,
6186 (Ho-Chunk Nation Sup. Ct. May 21, 1999) ("If not for the time constraints facing this
Court, I would request that in situations such as this [motion for recusal], that a separate
hearing be held, during which both parties would present their reasons and facts in support
of their belief that my relationship to Joan Greendeer-Lee renders me impartial."); Thomp-
son v. Hoof, 27 Indian L. Rptr. 6190, 6191-92 (Duckwater Shoshone Tribal Ct. Dec. 28,
1999) (discussing motion to recuse tribal court judge).
152. See, e.g., Greengrass, 26 Indian L. Rptr. at 6185 (discussing motion for recusal based
on fact thatjudge and party were first cousins).
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d. Discovery, Witnesses, and the Record-Tribal Courts may require
the Tribal government to provide some form of limited discovery
in order to ensure fairness in an administrative proceeding5  Dis-
covery often consists of photocopying the discharged employee's
personnel folder. For employees that have been working for the
Tribe a long time, the personnel folder might contain a vast
amount of irrelevant material. At this point, the Tribe must entrust
the photocopying of only relevant material to a non-lawyer, usually
a clerk in the personnel department. This employee might leave
out relevant material or keep in irrelevant material that may be
potentially inflammatory. It is likely that the employee will question
the removal of some documents and the inclusion of others. The
panel or its hearing officer will then have to delve into the task of
deciding which documents are relevant. More time is wasted.
The right to call witnesses and to cross-examine adverse wit-
nesses is generally required by Tribal Courts.154 As the Hoopa Valley
Court of Appeals stated:
In dealing with factual matters, the credibility and veracity of
the witnesses and documents submitted into evidence must be
determined by the decision maker. Simply because a docu-
ment is submitted into evidence does not make all statements
contained in that document 100 percent true. The basis for
the statements may show that the statements were made un-
der duress, or were based on inaccurate information. The
same is true of the testimony of witnesses. Therefore, it is es-
sential that the employee be afforded the opportunity to
confront and cross-examine witnesses and evidence.
1 5
In Johnson v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enterprise, the Court de-
scribed in detail how the ability to cross-examine the Tribal
government's witnesses might have affected the outcome of an
administrative hearing where the review board refused to allow
153. E.g., Koon, No. 95-07-048-CV at 3.
154. E.g., Johnson v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enter., No. MPTG-EA-97-120 at
1 38, 59 (Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ct. Jan. 21, 1998), available at www.tribal-
institute.org/opinions/1998.NAMP.0000012.htin (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform) (citations omitted).
155. Hoopa Valley Indian Hous. Auth. v. Gerstner, 22 Indian L. Rptr. 6002, 6006
(Hoopa Valley Ct. App. Sept. 27, 1993). The Gerstner Court also quoted Goldberg v. Kelly, 397
U.S. 254, 269 (1970), for the proposition, "In almost every setting where important decisions
turn on questions of fact, due process requires an opportunity to confront and cross-
examine adverse witnesses." Id.
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cross-examination and chose to believe the testimony of one wit-
ness over the other as the "sole factual basis" for its decision.
1
5
6
Witnesses nevertheless pose additional problems. Under a nor-
mative (i.e., dominant culture) view of the adjudicatory process,
only relevant evidence should be introduced.17 If, for example, a
manager discharged an employee for violating the employer's zero
tolerance rule on workplace violence after the employee allegedly
pushed another employee, then the only relevant witnesses should
be the two employees and anyone else who may have seen the inci-
dent.
But in a Tribal administrative hearing, the normal rules of evi-
dence do not necessarily apply. The panel may agree to hear
testimony from the discharged employee's grandfather, an elder
with a great deal of influence and respect in the community, who
will testify that he does not believe his grandson would ever push
another person. The panel may agree to hear testimony from an-
other employee who claimed to have overheard the accusing
employee make fun of the discharged employee, wrapping up with
her theory that the accusing employee made fallacious allegations
in a plot to have the discharged employee fired. Before long, both
the employee and the Tribe are bringing forth a parade of wit-
nesses without a shred of actual or eyewitness knowledge about the
actual incident leading to the discharge. As noted earlier, these
hearings can last for days. Panel members are placed in the diffi-
cult position of halting testimony from persons who are not
witnesses to anything, character witnesses, and testimony from eld-
ers and others that they may respect a great deal. Many panels do
not restrict the testimony, perhaps in order to avoid allegations of
favoritism and corruption. Because the panel members are usually
non-lawyers, they are not trained to make a distinction between
relevant testimony and testimony that should be excluded.
Tribal governments must also create a structure to maintain an
official record of the administrative proceeding. The administra-
tive hearing panel is charged with creating and, at least initially,
preserving the official record of the proceedings. Most often, the
hearing must be tape-recorded by either a member of the panel or
an employee sworn to confidentiality that acts as the panel's clerk.
The panel may allow the introduction of paper evidence and must
preserve the original copies. After the hearing, the permanent re-
cord of the proceedings must be preserved. If the Tribe has no
permanent depository for confidential archival material-a likely
156. Johnson, No. MPTC-EA-97-120 at 48.
157. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 401; MICH. R. EVID. 401.
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event-then the Tribe's legal department often is tasked with pre-
serving the files.
e. Standard of Review--Tribal governing bodies may choose to
limit the discretion of the administrative hearing panel. Some
Tribes choose to allow the panel to reverse the decision to dis-
charge the employee only if "clear and convincing evidence" exists
to justify a reversal. 58 Some Tribes allow for a "de novo" review of
the employment decision."9 Some allow for review on the adminis-
trative law basis of "abuse of discretion."160
While the choice of a certain standard of review by the adminis-
trative hearing panel is intended to influence the proceedings on a
basic level, this is rarely the result. Intuitively, the higher the stan-
dard for reversal of the decision to discharge, the less searching
and thorough review and the less likelihood of reversal. However,
the result often is that the administrative hearing panel searches
more thoroughly regardless, and may be tempted to go beyond the
bounds of the employment relationship and hear evidence on
character, family relationships, tribal history, and virtually anything
else to tip the scales one way or the other. Where tribal leadership
intends a more searching review-a sort of de novo administrative
review-the result is the same. Because of their legal inexperience,
a hearing panel of non-lawyers might not know when to stop taking
testimony and documentary evidence. The Indian community lay-
person's notion of due process may be that everyone gets to speak
for as long as he wants. Lawyers believe their duty of zealous repre-
sentation requires them to continue as long as they are able. The
discharged employee has no motivation to stop arguing if she
thinks she can talk the panel into reinstating her. Regardless of the
standard of review established by the tribal leadership, the hearings
grow lengthy and inefficient.
D. Unique Impacts on Tribal Governance
Employment hearing panels often become painful marathons of
emotional, political, and sociological torment. One Tribal Court
158. See infra notes 187 and 245.
159. See infra notes 247.
160. See, e.g., Short v. Hoopa Health Ass'n, No. A-99-008, slip op. at 7 (Hoopa Valley
Tribal Sup. Ct. Aug. 15, 2001) ("The decision of the [employee review panel] is upheld
unless it is proven to be arbitrary, capricious, or not in accordance with law.") (on file with
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
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described a particularly difficult hearing where the Tribal govern-
ment representatives employed a shotgun approach to indicting
the performance of the employee:
The cases did not stay ... simple .... Instead, the issues
shifted and multiplied.
The hearings were relatively lengthy, unstructured, and un-
disciplined. In each hearing, the case against the [employee]
was presented almost in a stream-of-consciousness fashion,
with one accusation and criticism followed more-or-less ran-
domly by another. By the conclusion of each hearing, any
sense of orderly presentation of the issues was lost amid the
myriad of additional claims that had been raised. The [em-
ployees] were not given adequate notice of plethora of claims
that they would have to face at these hearings, and even the
[administrative] panel members sometimes appear to have
been confused about which issues were before them.
Apparently, anything that came to mind was considered fair
game ....
[T] he employer seized on any complaint available or imagin-
able, whether related to the licensing policy, the problems of
running the center, the quality of patient care, the keeping of
files, attendance at meetings, graduate school transcripts, the
choice of graduate school course work, etc. The danger of
such an unconstrained and wide-ranging presentation at an
[administrative] hearing is that the issues raised are likely to
stray beyond those of which the [employee] has had any ade-
quate, advance notice.16
161. Synowski v. Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde, No. C-00-11-003, slip op. at 6-8
(remanding to Internal Review Board) (Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde Cmty. of Or.
Tribal
Ct. Oct. 3, 2001), available at http://www.grandronde.org/court/PublishedOpinions/
SynLewRam.PDF (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), aff'd, No.
A-01-10-001 (Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde Cmty. of Or. Ct. App. Jan. 22, 2002),
available at http://www.grandronde.org/court/PublishedOpinions/SynowskiAppeal.PDF
(on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
Other Tribal Courts have criticized the haphazard and even "unprofessional" manner in
which administrative appeals may be handled by both parties. E.g., Van Pelt v. Umatilla Res-
ervation Hous. Auth., 26 Indian L. Rptr. 6149, 6150 (Umatilla Tribal Ct. July 22, 1999)
("This whole matter was handled in a very unprofessional manner by both parties. No evi-
dence, certification, or documentation was presented which established when notices or
documents were served on the other .... The final administrative appeal requires a hearing
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The discharged employee, the managers, the employee wit-
nesses, and the elected representatives of the tribe may all get
involved in one way or another. An employment discharge is a dif-
ficult matter. Anyone who has been fired or laid-off knows this
intimately. Unlike federal, state, or local governments, which all
routinely rely on separate and professional hearing panels featur-
ing administrative judges or professional mediators, tribes with
limited funds must rely on their limited source of employees.
Other governments do not share the unique connections between
players in the process.
A former Tribal employee who appears before the Tribe's admin-
istrative hearing panel suffers a particularly humiliating experience.
The hearings are almost always closed, in a private room and with
limited spectators, in order to preserve confidentiality and to meet
due process considerations. However, the employee may be facing a
group of Tribal employees on the panel that she has worked with for
several years on different projects. These panelists may also be her
neighbors in the Tribal community. She may have even grown up
with the panelists. And she knows their foibles, their pet peeves,
their prejudices, their strengths, and their weaknesses. One might
expect that knowing one's panel so well would be a huge advantage,
but nothing could be more difficult to face than a room full of your
friends and acquaintances.
Perhaps just as difficult is the position of panel members. They
are being asked to judge a friend, a fellow Tribal Member, a fellow
employee, maybe even someone they have known for years. The
discharging manager, the employee witnesses, and anyone else in-
volved in the hearing is likely to have the same personal
connection to the others in the room. Tribal law, dictated by fed-
eral law, forces these individuals to confront each other and to
place their personal relationships on the line for an impersonal
procedure.
An employee's decision to take her case to the Tribal Court of-
fers even more exposure to the community. A former Tribal
employee who believes that she has been wronged is forced to give
up her veil of privacy in order to proceed with her claim pursuant
to this legal structure. Tribes are typically insular, with small popu-
lations and numerous, interlocking family relationships.
Speculation about a half-hidden event spreads quickly in small
communities. Moreover, Tribal employees work closely together,
panel, which may be one person. Petitioner participated in this process but it was not han-
dled in an artful manner.").
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with much overlap and interaction. When a fellow employee has an
accident, or has family problems, or gets into an argument, the
other employees see these events. While the details of the employ-
ment discharge are confidential, the fact of the discharge or other
employment decision is not confidential. That said, in an insular
community with interlocking family relationships and an insular
Tribal personnel network, it is nigh impossible to keep details con-
fidential.162 Moreover, as soon as a tribal employee, such as Bear
Tenzing, files his complaint in Tribal Court, his story loses its con-
fidentiality. Tribal Court records are typically public records. In
order for Bear to prevail on his side of the story, he has to open up
his private life for public inspection. In an insular community, this
fact chills the exercise of legal rights by wronged individuals.
Employment is a crucial factor in anyone's life. A job is one's
livelihood. A steady paycheck allows one the resources and stability
to afford a home, a lifestyle, and a family. Losing one's job creates
an incomparable strain on the family. Mortgage payments and car
payments cannot be paid. Personal property may be repossessed.
Family stresses increase exponentially. Job loss galvanizes people to
act, to file lawsuits, and to speak out against those they feel have
wronged them.
In many ways, Tribal government exists to help Tribal Members
when they have been wronged. But when the Tribal government is
accused of wronging one of its employees, the legal structure cre-
ated to ensure due process and to provide a remedy collides with
the political structure created to serve the whole of the Tribal
membership. In a state or local government or at a mid- or large-
sized corporation, the governing bodies are large enough or dif-
fuse enough to handle these stresses. In most Tribal governments,
however, the stresses placed on the governing body nearly breaks
down the government. A Tribal Member who has just been dis-
charged has every right to complain to the Tribal Council; after all,
Council members are the Tribal Member's elected representatives.
The Tribal Council, having delegated day-to-day operations to the
managers, may choose to intervene on behalf of the employee
against the interests of the Tribe, even against the interests of the
oath they swore to protect the Tribe. Or, more likely, a minority of
162. See Ames v. Hoopa Valley Tribal Council, 21 Indian L. Rptr. 6039, 6040 (Hoopa Val-
ley Tribal Ct. App. Dec. 14, 1991) (Irvin, J., concurring) ("This jurist would take judicial
notice of the fact that news travels fast on the reservation."). Cf In Re: Confederated Salish
& Kootenai Tribes v. Cahoon, 10 Indian L. Rptr. 6039 (Confederated Salish & Kootenai
Tribes of the Flathead Reservation Ct. App.June 21, 1983) (holding that prospective jurors
that are employees of the Tribes may be biased and therefore dismissed from service due to
their employment relationship).
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the Tribal Council may choose to intervene. In either case, the
Tribal Council as a political body collides with the Tribal Council as
employer. Without question, personnel questions have the capacity
to destroy or seriously undermine Tribal governments.
III. THE CONUNDRUM OF LIMITED TRIBAL COURT
REVIEW OF TRIBAL EMPLOYEE APPEALS.
In spite of the skepticism of critics, including several United
States Supreme Court Justices, 163 Tribal Courts continue to develop
and grow in a fundamentally positive way. As Connecticut Law
School Dean Nell Jessup Newton noted a few years ago:
When tribal courts have been subjected to intense scrutiny, as
they have been in the last fifteen years, they have survived the
test. Even investigations which began with apparent hostile in-
tent have ended by stressing the strengths of tribal courts and
noting that their weaknesses stem from lack of funding and
not pervasive bias.' 64
Tribal courts nonetheless encounter tremendous difficulty in re-
viewing tribal employment separations. Tribal sovereign immunity
often severely restricts the jurisdiction of tribal courts to engage in
such review, though the modern practice of tribes is to waive im-
munity to allow tribal court review.
After the final administrative determination that an employee
must be discharged, both individuals and the Tribe usually may
appeal to the Tribal Court.'65 Whether Tribal Court review follows is
subject to a few limitations. First, it is possible that neither the
Tribal Constitution nor a Tribal law will waive the sovereign immu-
nity of the Tribe, prohibiting a suit in Tribal Court or anywhere
else. 6  Second, the Tribe might not have a Tribal Court at all. 67 In
163. SeeNevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 384-85 (2001) (Souter, J., concurring).
164. Newton, supra note 5, at 287-88 (footnotes omitted).
165. E.g., Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians v. Comer, No. 02-09-
1351, slip op. at 3 (ruling on motions to dismiss) (Grand Traverse Band Tribal Ct. Feb. 25,
2003) (holding, on the basis of fundamental fairness, that the Tribe may appeal an adverse
decision from the administrative hearing panel) (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform).
166. E.g., Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Technologies, Inc., 523 U.S. 751 (1998); Holmes
v. St. Croix Casino; 26 Indian L. Rptr. 6089 (St. Croix App. 1999).
167. E.g., Krempel v. Prairie Island Indian Cmty., 125 F.3d 621 (8th Cir. 1997).
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such an event, the Tribal Council is the final decision-maker and a
discharged employee has no further recourse. However, fewer and
fewer Tribes are without their own judiciary.6 8 Therefore, this Arti-
cle will focus on the larger issue of sovereign immunity.
Federal and state courts generally do not have jurisdiction to en-
tertain a suit brought by a discharged employee against an Indian
Tribe or its officers. 169 There is no federal statute allowing such a
suit in federal court, diversity jurisdiction does not exist, and there
is a strong federal policy against meddling in the internal affairs of
a Tribal government.'7 Employment relations are a core element
of the internal affairs of a Tribal government. 7' In state courts, ab-
sent the agreement by both the Tribe and the state, the state courts
will not have jurisdiction. As a general matter of federal law, state
courts do not have jurisdiction over activities in Indian Country.1
72
A. Tribal Sovereign Immunity in Tribal and Federal Law
As a matter of both Tribal and federal law, Indian Tribes possess
sovereign immunity. 73 Only Congress or the Tribe in accordance
168. See generally B.J. Jones, Welcoming Tribal Courts into the Judicial Fraternity: Emerging Is-
sues in Trbal-State and Tribal-Federal Court Relations, 24 WILLIAM MITCHELL L. REV. 457 (1998).
169. See Gallegos v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, No. 02-2347, 2003 WL 22854632 (10th Cir.
Nov. 28, 2003); Penobscot Nation v. Fellencer, 164 F.3d 706 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 527 U.S.
1022 (1999); Shannon v. Houghton Band of Maliseet Indians, 54 F. Supp. 2d 35 (D. Me.
1999); see also Adams v. Grand Traverse Band Econ. Dev. Auth., No. 89-03-001-CV (APP), slip
op. at 3 (Grand Traverse Band Ct. App. Aug. 19, 1993) ("The United States Constitution and
federal laws consistently establish a strong rule that tribes must be left to handle their own
actions involving economic development.") (on file with the University of Michigan Journal
of Law Reform) (citing American Indian Agric. Credit Consortium v. Standing Rock Sioux
Tribe, 780 F.2d 1734 (8th Cir. 1985)). Cf Loring v. Tribal Government, 20 Indian L. Rptr.
6097, 6098 (1993) (Penobscot Nation Ct. App. May 26, 1992) (Cary, J., concurring) (refus-
ing to applying Maine law to the tribe).
170. Cf Dubray v. Rosebud Sioux Hous. Auth., 12 Indian L. Rptr. 6015, 6016 (Rosebud
Sioux Tribal Ct. Feb. 1, 1985) ("It is well settled that relations between Indians, while they
are on their reservations, cannot be controlled or governed by the laws of the state within
which the reservations are located.") (citing Foster v. Pryor, 189 U.S. 325 (1903)).
171. See EEOC v. Karuk Tribe Hous. Auth., 260 F.3d 1071, 1080 (9th Cir. 2001).
172. See California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987).
173. See Shananaquet v. Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians Econ. Dev.
Corp., No. 00-05-299-CV, slip op. at 2 (Grand Traverse Band Ct. App. March 18, 2003) (on
file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (citing Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978) (citing in turn Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354, 358
(1919)); United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. 506, 512-13
(1940); Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Dept. of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1977)); Martin
v. Hopi Tribe, 25 Indian L. Rptr. 6185, 6187 (Hopi Tribe Ct. App. Mar. 29, 1996); Francis v.
Wilkinson, 20 Indian L. Rptr. 6015, 6015 (Northern Plains Intertribal Ct. App. Jan. 21,
1993); Pinnecoose v. Board of Commissioners, 19 Indian L. Rptr. 6072, 6072 (Southwest
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with Tribal law may waive the immunity.1 4 The sovereign immunity
of Indian tribes precludes suits against tribes for money damages
or equitable relief' 75 and also acts as "an entitlement not to stand
trial." 176 This immunity is absolute.177 "When a tribe or its agencies
are sued in tribal court, the scope, protection, and meaning of
tribal sovereign immunity are governed primarily by tribal, rather
than federal or state, law, although other bodies of doctrine may be
looked to for guidance by analogy."
178
Sovereign immunity is an important element to the efficient de-
velopment of Tribal government and is "necessary to promote
'tribal self-determination, economic development, and cultural
autonomy.' "179 As one Tribal Court wrote, "[S]overeign immunity
[is] an essential attribute of Indian tribes and [is] to be highly sup-
ported unless clearly waived. It serves to avoid interruption of tribal
government and agents in improper law suits and to protect public
Intertribal Ct. App. Jan. 23, 1992); Board of Trustees v. Wynde, 18 Indian L. Rptr. 6033,
60336 (1991) (Northern Plains Intertribal Ct. App., May 3, 1990); Wichita Tribe v. Bell, 18
Indian L. Rptr. 6041, 6042 (1991) (Court of Indian Appeals for Wichita & Affiliated Tribes
Sept. 25, 1990) (citing Ponca Tribal Election Bd. v. Snake, 17 Indian L. Rptr. 6085 (Court of
Indian Appeals for Ponca Tribe Nov. 10, 1988), and McCormick v. Election Committee of
the Sac & Fox Tribe, 1980 WL 128844 (Court of Indian Offenses for Sac & Fox Tribe Feb. 1,
1980)); Gwin v. Four Bears Casino and Lodge, 30 Indian L. Rptr. 6120, 6121 (Three Affili-
ated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation Dist. Ct. Feb. 10, 2003); Lonchar v. Victories
Casino, No. C-022-1200, slip op. at 1-2 (ruling on summary judgment) (Little Traverse Bay
Bands Tribal Ct. Feb. 11, 2002) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Re-
form); Dubray v. Rosebud Sioux Hous. Auth., 12 Indian L. Rptr. 6015, 6015 (Rosebud Sioux
Tribal Ct. Feb. 1, 1985).
174. See Hawkins v. Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians, No. 98-04-148-
CV, slip op. at 2 (decision on summary disposition) (Grand Traverse Band Tribal Ct. Feb. 7,
2000) ("The United States Supreme Court has consistently held that Indian tribal govern-
ments have sovereign immunity unless such immunity has been expressly waived by either
Congress or the particular tribal government.") (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform) (citing Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978)).
175. Gwin, 30 Indian L. Rptr. at 6121 (citing Duncan Energy v. Three Affiliated Tribes
of the Fort Berthold Reservation, 812 E Supp. 1008, 1011 (D. N.D. 1992), rev'd on other
grounds, 27 F.3d 1294 (8th Cir. 1994)).
176. Gwin, 30 Indian L. Rptr. at 6121 (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985)).
177. Colville Tribal Enter. Corp. v. Orr, 26 Indian L. Rptr. 6005, 6006 (Confederated
Tribes of Colville Reservation Ct. App. Dec. 4, 1998) (citing United States v. United States
Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. 506, 513 (1940); American Indian Ag. Credit Consortium,
Inc. v. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 780 F.2d 1374, 1378-79 (8th Cir. 1985); Chemehuevi
Indian Tribe v. California State Bd. of Equalization, 757 E2d 1047, 1052 n. 6 (9th Cir.), rev'd
on othergrounds, 474 U.S. 9 (1985)).
178. Thompson v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe Board of Police Commissioners, 23 In-
dian L. Rptr. 6045, 6046 (Cheyenne River Sioux Ct. App. Feb. 9, 1996).
179. Martin v. Hopi Tribe, 25 Indian L. Rptr. 6185, 6187 (Hopi Tribe Ct. App. Mar. 29,
1996) (quoting American Indian Ag. Credit v. Standing Rock Sioux Tribe, 780 F.2d 1374,
1378 (8th Cir. 1985)).
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funds from improper distribution under the Tribal Constitution.', 8 0
Sovereign immunity prevents depletion of valuable common re-
sources and protects against litigation interfering with the
operation of the Tribe.'8' The influential Navajo Nation Supreme
Court agreed:
The Navajo people are entitled to a representative and ac-
countable Navajo tribal government. For this reason, important
decisions having direct consequences on the Navajo tribal
treasury should be made by the elected representatives of the
Navajo people. If we hold that the ICRA has waived the sover-
eign immunity of the Navajo Nation in Navajo courts, we will
be sanctioning an attack on the tribal treasury. Such decisions
are best made by elected Navajo representatives after consulta-
tion with their constituents.
In addition, the funds of the Navajo Nation are not unlimited.
Each year the funds maintained by the Navajo Nation for the
operation of the Navajo tribal government are exceeded by
the people's demand for more governmental services. ICRA
suits which result in money damages against the Navajo Na-
tion will only divert funds allocated for essential governmental
services.'
8 2
180. DeVerney v. Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians, No. 96-10-201
CV, slip op. at 2 (Grand Traverse Band Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2000) (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform). See also Sturgeon Electric Co. v. ARA MACA Power Ser-
vice, 26 Indian L. Rptr. 6026, 6027-28 (Fort Mojave Indian Reservation Ct. App. Dec. 7,
1998) ("Immunity is a fundamental aspect of sovereignty which protects a government from
suit to avoid undue intrusion on governmental functions or depletion of the government's
assets without the government's consent.").
181. DeVerney, No. 96-10-201 CV at 2 (amended order) (Grand Traverse Band Ct. App.
Feb. 7, 2001) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). See also
Guardipee v. Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde Cmty. of Or., 19 Indian L. Rptr. 6111
(Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde Cmty. of Or. Tribal Ct. June 11, 1992) ("Moreover, it
has been held that tribal sovereign immunity is necessary to preserve and protect tribal as-
sets from claims and judgments that would soon deplete tribal resources.") (citing Maryland
Casualty Co. v. Citizens Nat'l Bank of N. Hollywood, 361 F.2d 517, 521-22 (5th Cir. 1966).
182. Johnson v. Navajo Nation, 14 Indian L. Rptr. 6037, (Navajo Nation Sup. Ct. 1987).
See also Gonzales v. Allen, 17 Indian L. Rptr. 6121, 6122 (Shoshone-Bannock Tribal Ct. Sept.
17, 1990) ("The legislative and executive branches of government have the responsibility for
determining the purposes and the extent to which government funds will be utilized. Absent
explicit waiver of such authority the courts do not usually have the authority to spend such
funds. Nor do the courts have authority to waive sovereign immunity on behalf of the gov-
ernment."). Cf Newton, supra note 5, at 338 ("In the pithy words of Judge Quinn of the Ho-
Chunk Tribal Court, ... 'It is not long ago that the only thing standing between the nation
and bankruptcy was sovereign immunity.'") (quoting Kingsley v. Ho-Chunk Nation, 23 In-
dian L. Rptr. 6113, 6117 n. 3 (Ho-Chunk Nation Trial Ct. 1996)).
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Tribal Courts generally hold that the concept of sovereign im-
munity "does not defy Native American traditions.... ,"8'
One Tribal Court pondered the dilemma posed to Tribal Courts
about sovereign immunity under Tribal law and suggested that the
Tribal government must deliberate carefully on its application:
Sovereign immunity is an English-law doctrine that "the king
can do no wrong." One cannot sue the king. This ancient
doctrine came to this country with the adoption of English
law as the legal foundation for the development of law in the
new United States.... Since that earlier time, many non-
Native governments have waived their immunity in various ar-
eas to provide redress for government negligence and
wrongdoing. Reasons for the various waivers might be gener-
alized to say that the people of a representative democracy
realize that "the king" can do wrong and does make mistakes.
After all, government is a human institution and the maxim
"to err is human" is undisputed. Fundamental fairness re-
quires that there be an opportunity for redress, surely in
everyone's book. However on the other hand, governmental
immunity ensures that no one can "break the bank" by a
bank-breaking award of tribal assets. No one wants to see the
government bankrupted. It seems reasonable to expect the
Tribal Council to look at these various considerations and de-
velop well-reasoned positions on immunity as it relates to this
tribal community. After all, this is not England. We do give a
lot of lip service to the fact that Indian communities are dif-
ferent hat those of dominant society. We point out that our
'judicial' and 'legal' systems need not be the mirror image of
those of dominant society. If that is truly the case, why should
tribal government adopt the Anglo-American concept of sov-
ereign immunity? Rather, why shouldn't tribal sovereign
183. Novak Construction Co. v. Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians,
No. 00-09-423-APP, slip op. at 3 (Grand Traverse Band Ct. App. Dec. 2, 2001) (on file with
the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). See also Sulcer v. Barrett, 17 Indian L.
Rptr. 6138, 6139-40 (Citizen Band Potawatomi Indians of Okla. Sup. Ct. Sept. 5, 1990)
(RiceJ., concurring) ("While the doctrine of sovereign immunity is admittedly of European
origin, it is entirely consistent with the tribal constitution and common law ... ."). Cf
O'Brien v. Fort Mojave Tribal Ct., 11 Indian L. Rptr. 6001, 6002 (Fort Mojave Tribal Ct. Dec.
8, 1983) (explicitly rejecting the doctrine of Tribal sovereign immunity).
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immunity mirror tribal culture? It is difficult to imagine that
an outdated English doctrine fits this tribe's needs.
1 84
As a general matter, unless properly waived, sovereign immunity
will defeat a claim of wrongful termination in Tribal Courts. 185 Im-
munity may only be expressly waived, not impliedly waived.8  One
Tribal Court held that a plaintiff must demonstrate "by clear and
convincing evidence" that a waiver exists. 87 Moreover, a Tribal offi-
cial, "acting alone and without proper tribal legislative authority,"
may not waive the immunity of a Tribe. However, a statute or
Tribal charter containing a "sue or be sued" clause may be suffi-
cient to effectuate a waiver. "9 Additionally, a personnel manual that
states, "the Tribe shall agree to be a party to the suit" may also be
sufficient to effectuate a waiver.'90
A Tribe may narrowly tailor its waiver of immunity."" For
example, one Tribal appellate court reversed a lower court ruling
that required the Tribe to remove a written reprimand from an
employee's personnel file because the Tribe's statutory waiver did
not expressly allow for such an order. 92 Another Tribal Court held
that a waiver of immunity for personal injury actions against its
gaming enterprise did not effectuate a waiver by the Tribe in an
employment dispute.'9 Yet another Tribal Court held that the
Tribe's waiver of immunity did not extend to claims of loss of
184. Deckrow v. Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians, No. C-006-0398, slip op. at
4-5 (ruling on motion to dismiss) (Little Traverse Bay Bands Tribal Ct. Feb. 22, 1999) (on
file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform) (emphasis omitted).
185. See, e.g., McLean v. Rosebud Hous. Auth., 26 Indian L. Rptr. 6147, 6148-49 (Rose-
bud Sioux Tribal Ct. May 4, 1999); Gonzales v. Allen, 17 Indian L. Rptr. 6121, 6122
(Shoshone-Bannock Tribal Ct. Sept. 17, 1990).
186. See Colville Tribal Enter. Corp. v. Orr, 26 Indian L. Rptr. 6005, 6006 (Confederated
Tribes of Colville Reservation Ct. App. Dec. 4, 1998) (citing Naff v. Colville Confederated
Tribes, 22 Indian L. Rptr. 6032 (1995)); Lovermi v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla., 23
Indian L. Rptr. 6090, 6091 (Miccosukee Tribal Ct. Apr. 17, 1996).
187. Ponca Tribal Election Bd. v. Snake, 17 Indian L. Rptr. 6085, 6091 (Court of Indian
Appeals for Ponca Tribe Nov. 10, 1988).
188. Executive Comm. of the Wichita Tribe v. Bell, 18 Indian L. Rptr. 6041, 6042 (Court
of Indian Appeals for Wichita & Affiliated Tribes Sept. 25, 1990).
189. See Kizer v. Walker River Hous. Auth., 23 Indian L. Rptr. 6214, 6214 (Inter-Tribal
Ct.%App. of NevadaJune 10, 1996) (holding that Tribal housing authority charter containing
"sue and be sued" clause had waived its immunity).
190. E.g., Martin v. Hopi Tribe, 25 Indian L. Rptr. 6185, 6189 (Hopi Tribe Ct. App. Mar.
29, 1996).
191. Seegenerally Thompson v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe Board of Police Comm'rs, 23
Indian L. Rptr. 6045, 6048-50 (Cheyenne River Sioux Ct. App. Feb. 9, 1996) (discussing the
import of the scope of a tribe's waiver of immunity from suit).
192. See Cloud v. Smith, 25 Indian L. Rptr. 6030, 6031 (Ho-Chunk Nation Sup. Ct. Jan.
8,1998).
193. See Shourds v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enter., 24 Indian L. Rptr. 6011, 6012
(Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ct. Apr. 20, 1995).
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consortium.19 4 In more modern Tribal Constitutions, the drafters
may include a narrow waiver for specific purposes, such as suing
for injunctive relief or to protect constitutional rights. A Tribal
Constitution may also prescribe the exact procedure to enact a
waiver of immunity.95 Some Tribes waive immunity only for a
specific timeframe, thus building in a statute of limitations and a cap
on damages and interest that cannot be waived by any party except
the Tribal Council.9" If a Tribe chooses to waive its immunity for
purposes of allowing a former employee to seek judicial review of
her discharge, the Tribe may narrowly tailor the waiver. As arms of
Tribal government, Tribal subordinate organizations also enjoy
immunity from suit. This includes enterprises formed by Tribes for
the purpose of economic development.99 Subordinate organizations
194. See Galardi v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enter., 24 Indian L. Rptr. 6191, 6191
(Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ct. Apr. 8, 1996).
195. E.g., Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians Const. art. XIII, § 1,
available at http://thorpe.ou.edu/constitution/GTBcons3.hunl (on file with the University
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
196. See, e.g., Simplot v. Ho-Chunk Nation Dept. of Health, 23 Indian L. Rptr. 6235,
6243 (Ho-Chunk Nation Trial Ct. Aug. 29, 1996) (discussing a two-thousand dollar cap on
damages).
197. See Wilson v. Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians Hous. Auth., No.
01-06-375-CV, slip op. at 2 (ruling on summary disposition) (Grand Traverse Band Tribal Ct.
March 12, 2002) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (citing
Morgan v. Colorado River Indian Tribe, 443 P.2d 421 (Ariz. 1968); White Mountain Apache
Tribe v. Shelley, 480 P.2d 654 (Ariz. 1971)); McLean v. Rosebud Hous. Auth., 26 Indian L.
Rptr. 6147, 6148-49 (Rosebud Sioux Tribal Ct. May 4, 1999); Lovermi, 23 Indian L. Rptr. at
6091; Defender v. Bear King, 17 Indian L. Rptr. 6078, 6079 (Standing Rock Sioux Tribal Ct.
Oct. 26, 1989). Cf DuPree v. Cheyenne River Hous. Auth., 16 Indian L. Rptr. 6106, 6107
(Cheyenne River Sioux Ct. App. Aug. 19, 1988) (remanding to lower court determine
whether "sue and be sued" clause contained in Tribal housing authority charter effectuated
a waiver of immunity).
198. E.g., Shananaquet v. Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians Econ.
Dev. Corp., No. 00-05-299-CV, slip op. at 2 (decision on summary disposition) (Grand Trav-
erse Band Tribal Ct. Oct. 23, 2002) (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law
Reform), affd, No. 00-05-299-CV (Grand Traverse Band Ct. App. March 18, 2003) (on file
with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); Lonchar v. Victories Casino, No. C-
022-1200, slip op. at 2 (ruling on motion for summaryjudgment and dismissal) (Little Traverse
Bay Bands Tribal Ct. Feb. 11, 2002) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform) (citing Morgan v. Colorado River Indian Tribe, 443 P.2d 421 (Ariz. 1968); Holmes v.
St. Croix Casino, 26 Indian L. Rptr. 6089, 6094 (St. Croix Ct. App.Jan. 4, 1999); Sturgeon Elec-
tric Co. v. AHA MACA Power Service, 26 Indian L. Rptr. 6026, 6027-28 (Fort Mojave Indian
Reservation Ct. App. Dec. 7, 1998); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Shelley, 480 P.2d 654
(Ariz. 1971)); Lovermi, 23 Indian L. Rptr. at 6092; Johnson v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming
Enter., No. MPTC-EA-95-136 at 29 (Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ct. Dec. 11, 1995), available
at www.tribalresourcecenter.org/opinions/opfolder/1995.NAMP.000026.htm (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (citation omitted), affd, 25 Indian L. Rptr.
6011 (Mashantucket Pequot Ct. App. June 11, 1996). Cf Eosso v. Foxwoods High Stakes Bingo
& Casino, 23 Indian L. Rptr 6027, 6027-28 (Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ct. Feb. 11, 1994)
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are subject to suit where the Tribe chooses to waive its immunity. For
example, entities chartered in a document containing a "sue or be
sued" clause, such as many Section 17 corporations,' may be held
to have waived their immunity.2 0 Moreover, at least one Tribal Court
has held that a Tribally-charted economic development enterprise is
not entitled to raise the immunity defense where the Tribal
constitution has waived the sovereign immunity of the Tribe.20 '
Most Tribal Courts do not find that ICRA waives a Tribe's im-
munity.2 0 2 Some Tribal Courts hold that the Tribal Constitutional
due process provisions can trump the Tribe's sovereign immu-
nity.2°s One Tribal Court held that the Tribal Constitutional
guarantee of the right to petition for action to redress grievances
trumps Tribal sovereign immunity.204 Another Tribal Court also
held that the enactment of an internal personnel policy providing
for third party review of employment decisions waives the Tribe's
immunity.20 5 Yet another Tribal Court held that the Tribe waives its
immunity when it adopts an IRA constitution with a "sue and be
sued" clause contained within.0 6 However, where the "sue and be
(holding that tribal Court did not have jurisdiction over tribal economic development en-
terprise).
199. See 25 U.S.C. § 477 (2000).
200. E.g., White Horse v. Four Bears Casino & Lodge, 25 Indian L. Rptr. 6079, 6081
(Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation Dist. Ct. Nov. 5., Dec. 11., and Dec. 29,
1997) (citing Wells v. Fort Berthold Cmty. Coll., 24 Indian L. Rptr. 6157, 6157 (Three Affili-
ated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation Dist. Ct. Mar. 31, 1997)).
201. See Kakwich v. Menominee Tribal Enters., 21 Indian L. Rptr. 6112, 6113-14 (Me-
nominee Sup. Ct. Aug. 9, 1994).
202. See, e.g., Bonacci v. Tribal Council of the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chip-
pewa Indians, No. 00-04-176-CV, slip op. at 2-3 (ruling on motion to dismiss) (Grand
Traverse Band Tribal Ct. Jan. 9, 2003) (adopting the analysis in McCormick v. Election
Comm. of the Sac & Fox Tribe, 1 Okla. Trib. 8, 19, 1980 WL 128844 (Sac & Fox CIO, Feb. 1,
1980) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); Sliger v. Stamack,
No. 99-10-490-CV, slip op. at 2 (decision on motion for reconsideration) (Grand Traverse
Band Tribal Ct. Feb. 14, 2000) (adopting McCormick analysis) (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform). "The vast majority of both federal and tribal court cases
have held that the Indian Civil Rights Act is not a waiver of tribal sovereign immunity." Gon-
zales x Allen, 17 Indian L. Rptr. 6121, 6122 (Shoshone-Bannock Tribal Ct. Sept. 17, 1990).
But see Davis v. Keplin, 18 Indian L. Rptr. 6148, 6150 (Turtle Mountain Tribal Ct. Sept. 6,
1991) ("[T]his court notes that the majority of tribal courts which have addressed this issue
have held that ICRA violations are addressable in tribal court .... ").
203. E.g., Hudson v. Hoh Indian Tribe, 21 Indian L. Rptr. 6045, 6046 (Hoh Ct. App.
May 28, 1992). Cf McFall v. Victories Casino, No. A-002-1102, slip op. at 3-7 (Little Traverse
Bay Bands Ct. App.,June 9, 2003) (arguing that the Tribal government cannot waive the due
process rights of Tribal employees) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform).
204. See Hudson, 21 Indian L. Rptr. at 6046.
205. See Gwin v. Four Bears Casino and Lodge, 30 Indian L. Rptr. 6120, 6121 (Three Af-
filiated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation Dist. Ct. Feb. 10, 2003).
206. See Bd. of Trustees v. Wynde, 18 Indian L. Rptr. 6033, 6036 (Northern Plains Inter-
tribal Ct. App. May 3, 1990) (Godtland, J., dissenting) (arguing that Tribe's "sue and be
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sued" clause does not explicitly reference a personnel claim or
employment contract claim, a Tribal Court may not find a waiver of
immunity.
0 7
Most questions of Tribal immunity are clear. Either the Tribe
waived its immunity or not. If the Tribe could be forced to expend
dollars or other resources and it has not waived its immunity, then
the suit may not proceed. The analytical difficulties for tribal
courts arise where tribal officials are sued in their official or indi-
vidual capacities.
In the event that a Tribe has not waived its immunity, or in the
event that a Tribe's waiver is too narrowly tailored to suit a poten-
tial plaintiff, the discharged employee may have no recourse but to
attempt to invoke the Ex parte Young doctrine in Tribal Court and
sue the individual Tribal Council officers or employees in their of-
ficial and, occasionally, individual capacities for injunctive relief.208
A plaintiff might also sue the members of the appeals board.
Whether the Tribe has waived the official immunity of individual
Tribal officials and employees is a complex question. Whether in-
dividuals may be sued for money damages in their individual
capacities is an even more difficult and important question, but is
beyond the scope of this article.
B. Official Immunity of Tribal Officers
1. Tribal Court Application of the Official Immunity Doctrine-
"Tribal officials, officers, employees and agents are immune from
suit when acting in their representative capacities on behalf of a
tribe or a tribal agency or arm of tribal government."2°9 As such,
sued" clause should constitute a waiver of immunity). Cf Kizer v. Walker River Hous. Auth.,
23 Indian L. Rptr. 6214, 6214 (Inter-Tribal Ct. App. of NevadaJune 10, 1996) (holding that
Tribal housing authority charter containing "sue and be sued" clause had waived its immu-
nity). See generally Thompson v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe Bd. of Police Comm'rs, 23
Indian L. Rptr. 6045, 6050 (Cheyenne River Sioux Ct. App. Feb. 9, 1996) (discussing Tribal
and federal law relating to "sue and be sued" clauses in Tribal housing authority charters).
207. See Dubray v. Rosebud Sioux Hous. Auth., 12 Indian L. Rptr. 6015, 6015 (Rosebud
Sioux Tribal Ct. Feb. 1, 1985).
208. E.g., Simplot v. Ho-Chunk Nation Dep't of Health, 23 Indian L. Rptr. 6235, 6241
(Ho-Chunk Nation Trial Ct. Aug. 29, 1996).
209. Hayward v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Council, 30 Indian L. Rptr. 6206, 6210
(Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ct. Sept. 17, 2003) (citing Bassett v. Mashantucket Pequot
Museum and Research Center, Inc., 221 F. Supp. 2d 271, 277-78 (D. Conn. 2002));
Romanella v. Hayward, 933 F. Supp. 163, 167 (D. Conn. 1996), affd on other grounds, 114 F.3d
15 (2nd Cir. 1997)). See also Youvella v. Dallas, 27 Indian L. Rptr. 6020, 6021 (2000) (Hopi
Tribe Ct. App., Nov. 29, 1998). But see Strickland v. DeCouteau, 31 Indian L. Rptr. 6121, 6021
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elected members of a Tribe's governmental body cannot be sued
"[w] hen acting in their official capacity .. .. ,,20 However, Tribal of-
ficials may be sued for non-monetary, equitable relief if they have
acted outside the scope of their authority.21 As one Tribal Court
explained, "[t]he standard to abrogate ... qualified immunity as
applied to public officials requires the plaintiff to allege and show
that the officials' action exceeded their lawful authority and vio-
lated a law or statute that clearly established a right vested in the
individual who was harmed."
2 12
The initial question for tribal courts is whether the claim of im-
munity is made in accordance with federal legal authorities or
Tribal legal authorities. If the Tribal legislature has enacted a
statute that explicitly states who may have the benefit of immunity,214
the question is solely one of Tribal law. If, however, Tribal law is
silent, then Tribal Courts generally will follow federal and state
cases.215 Few Tribal Court decisions engage in a discussion of the
difference between Tribal sovereign immunity and official quali-
fied or absolute immunity. Where the Tribe is sued for damages or
injunctive relief and has not waived its immunity, courts have no
jurisdiction over the case. 6 Moreover, where an individual is sued
and the only relief requested would be paid by the Tribe, the court
has no jurisdiction absent a waiver of Tribal sovereign immunity.217
(Turtle Mountain Tribal Ct. Nov. 25, 2003) (citing Campbell v. Ark. Dept. of Corr., 155 F.3d
950, 962 (8th Cir. 1998); Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978)).
210. Hayward, 30 Indian L. Rptr. at 6210 (citing Imperial Granite Co. v. Pala Band of
Mission Indians, 940 F.2d 1269, 1271 (9th Cir. 1991)).
211. E.g., Decorah v. Whitewater, 25 Indian L. Rptr. 6248, 6249 (Ho-Chunk Nation Sup.
Ct. Oct. 26, 1998); Thompson v. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe Bd. of Police Comm'rs, 23
Indian L. Rptr. 6045, 6047-49 (Cheyenne River Sioux Ct. App. Feb. 9, 1996); GNS, Inc. v.
Blackhawk, 24 Indian L. Rptr. 6139, 6139 (Winnebago Tribal Ct. Sept. 26, 1996), rev'd on
other grounds, 24 Indian L. Rptr. 6260 (1997) (Winnebago Sup. Ct. Oct. 9, 1997).
212. Davis v. Keplin, 18 Indian L. Rptr. 6148, 6150 (Turtle Mountain Tribal Ct. Sept. 6,
1991) (citing Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978)).
213. See Rave v. Reynolds, 23 Indian L. Rptr. 6150, 6161-62 (Winnebago Tribe of Ne-
braska Sup. Ct. July 9, 1996).
214. E.g., 6 Grand Traverse Band Code § 104(a) (2004) ("Members of the Tribal Coun-
cil remain immune from suit for actions taken during the course and within the scope of
their duties as members of the Tribal Council."), available at http://doc.narf.org/nill/
Codes/gtcode/travcode6immunity.htm (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of
Law Reform).
215. See generally Russel Lawrence Barsh, Putting the Tribe in Tribal Courts: Possible? Desir-
able?, 8 KAN.J. L. & PuB. POL'y 74 (Winter 1999)
216. See Gwin v. Four Bears Casino and Lodge, 30 Indian L. Rptr. 6120, 6120 (Three Af-
filiated Tribes of Fort Berthold Reservation Dist. Ct. Feb. 10, 2003) (citing Hagen v. Sisseton-
Wahpeton Cmty. Coll., 205 F.3d 1040 (8th Cir. 2000)).
217. E.g., GNS, Inc. v. Blackhawk, 24 Indian L. Rptr. 6260, 6262 (Winnebago Sup. Ct.
Oct. 9, 1997) (denying claim on basis of sovereign immunity that would "reach the assets of
the tribal treasury"). See generally Sulcer v. Barrett, 17 Indian L. Rptr. 6138, 6140 (Citizen
Band Potawatomi Indians of Okla. Sup. Ct., Sept. 5, 1990) (Rice,J, concurring) ("It is black
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However, what it less clear is where the defendants are Tribal offi-
cials or Tribal employees sued in their official and individual
capacities. It is in this instance where the analysis of many Tribal
Courts collapses.
Perhaps the best discussion of Tribal immunity and official im-
munity is contained in Rave v. Reynolds, a 1996 decision of the
Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska Supreme Court.219 In Rave, the plain-
tiffs brought a case against the Tribe and its elected officials
contesting Tribal elections. The court held that the elected officials
of the Tribe were entitled to official immunity because their ac-
tions did not exceed the scope of their authority,20 but that since
Tribal law expressly allowed for the plaintiffs' request for injunctive
and declaratory relief, the case could continue.22 The court wisely
chose to clearly demarcate the differences between the immunity
of the Tribe and the immunity, if any, of elected officials and em-
ployees. Utilizing the federal law of official immunity by analogy,
the Rave court held that Tribal officials, unless they are judges,
maintain a form of qualified official immunity,23 "limiting their
damage exposure to those cases in which they acted in violation of
a legal rule of which they knew or had reason to know.,
2 4
letter hornbook law that litigants cannot emasculate the doctrine of sovereign immunity by
bringing court actions for relief against governmental agents acting on behalf of the sover-
eign. For the sovereign can act only through its agents, and when a judgment is entered
against the sovereign agents, the judgment is ajudgment against the sovereign although the
judgment is nominally directed against the sovereign's agent.") (citing Larson v. Domestic
and Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 688 (1949)).
218. One tribal court articulated two "recognized" exceptions to "the common law doc-
trine of sovereign immunity: (1) action by officers beyond statutory powers; and (2) exercise
of powers that are unconstitutional or exercised in an unconstitutional manner." Stone v.
Swan, 19 Indian L. Rptr. 6093, 6094 (Colville Confederated Tribes Indian Reservation Tribal
Ct. Apr. 15, 1992) (citations omitted). Like some other tribal courts, see Youvella v. Dallas,
27 Indian L. Rptr. 6020, 6021-22 (Hopi Tribe Ct. App. Nov. 20, 1998), that Court blurred
the separate doctrines of tribal sovereign immunity and qualified official immunity, creating
doctrinal confusion. See, e.g., Stone v. Somday, 10 Indian L. Rptr. 6039, 6041 & n. 11 (1983)
(Colville Tribal Ct. Jan. 13, 1983) (pointing to language in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,
436 U.S. 49, 59 (1978), on whether a Tribal official is clothed with Tribal sovereign immu-
nity as a "source of much debate and some confusion") (citing Alvin J. Ziontz, After
Martinez: CivilRights Under Tribal Government, 12 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1, 6 (1979)).
219. 23 Indian L. Rptr. 6150 (Winnebago Tribe of Neb. Sup. Ct. July 9, 1996).
220. See id. at 6161.
221. See id. at 6164.
222. See id. at 6162 ("Clearly demarcating and separating the legal question of tribal
sovereign immunity from the issue of tribal official immunity avoids this unfortunate conse-
quence.").
223. See id. at 6164 ("Insofar as tribal officials have any immunity..., that immunity is
an official immunity not a derivative sovereign immunity.").
224. Id. at 6162 (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982)).
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The Rave court also identified the important problem in some
Tribal Court decisions where the Court blurred the line between
Tribal sovereign immunity and the official qualified immunity of
Tribal officials. The Court discussed the two Tribal Court cases that
mixed the doctrines, Cleveland v. Blackhawk225 and Satiacum v.
Sterud.226 Cleveland held that Tribal sovereign immunity protected
Tribal officials unless they acted outside the scope of their author-
ity.227 The Cleveland court relied upon the Satiacum decision, which
held that since an Indian tribe can act only through its officers,
Tribal sovereign immunity extends to Tribal officials. 28 Rave fol-
lowed in time, if not in theory, Thompson v. Cheyenne River Sioux
Tribe Board of Police Commissioners,229 which accurately analyzed the
distinction between Tribal immunity and official immunity when it
observed that a Tribe may extend its sovereign immunity to Tribal
officials by express action. 3° Other courts have taken alternative
views of the official immunity doctrine, forming their own com-
mon law. For example, one Tribal Court has held that elected
members of a Tribal government have legislative immunity for ac-
tions taken within the scope of their duties.2 3' That court also
found that employees of the Tribe have "good faith immunity," a
notion equivalent to qualified, official immunity.
32
Blurring these doctrines encourages plaintiffs' attorneys to sue
individual employees and officers for money damages, especially if
the Tribe has not waived its immunity to a lawsuit for money dam-
ages. Such a result hampers Tribal government operations in
fundamental ways. Tribal employees would no longer be free to act
in the best interests of the Tribe, only in their own interest of
avoiding personal liability. Once local attorneys are aware of the
Tribal Court's ambiguous immunity jurisprudence, they will line up
to exploit it. The resulting litigation explosion may do irreparable
harm to the Tribal community, as well as to employee morale and
the Tribal asset base. As such, it is critical for Tribal Courts to prop-
erly understand and explain their immunity jurisprudence.
225. 22 Indian L. Rptr. 6090 (Winnebago Tribal Ct. July 7, 1995).
226. 10 Indian L. Rptr. 6013 (Puyallup Tribal Ct. Apr. 23, 1982).
227. Cleveland, 22 Indian L. Rptr. at 6091.
228. See id. (citing Satiacum, 10 Indian L. Rptr. at 6015).
229. 23 Indian L. Rptr. 6045 (Cheyenne River Sioux Ct. App. Feb. 9, 1996).
230. See id. at 6047-48.
231. See Smith v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 23 Indian L. Rptr. 6256, 6257
(Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes of Flathead Reservation Ct. App. Aug. 8, 1996)
(citing Tenny v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951); Chappell v. Robbins, 73 F.3d 918 (9th Cir.
1996)).
232. See id.
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2. The Problem of the Arbitrary and Capricious Politician or
Manager-The Rave court identified the problem of the arbitrary
and capricious Tribal politician or manager. At some point, most
Tribal Courts will face a complaint brought by a discharged em-
ployee where the Tribe has not sufficiently waived its immunity and
where the bad actor is a Tribal officer acting in her official capacity.
At that point, the Rave court noted, Tribal Courts may feel com-
pelled to find a waiver by bending the rules on sovereign or official
immunity "merely to adjudicate legitimate claims against mis-
guided tribal officials who seriously harm persons while acting
within the scope of their authority."23 3 Generally, however, most
Tribal Courts will not "second-guess the motives of elected tribal
officials .... Questioning the motives and politics of the business
committee is a function of the electorate."
23 4
The Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians
Court of Appeals, in Adams v. Grand Traverse Band Economic Devel-
opment Authority, 5 crafted its own particular standard for
determining when an individual may be personally liable to a
wronged employee. The court acknowledged the official immunity
of Tribal officials, holding "that the parties will have no personal
liability if [the court] found that they were acting in their official
capacities."236 The Adams Court articulated an interesting standard
for the lower court to determine when an individual could be per-
sonally liable for money damages: "We hold that the officers and
managers could be personally liable if the trial court finds on the
evidence that there is liability for actions that were entirely per-
sonal, clearly unauthorized by the parties' duties, and having
nothing to do with any party's office." 37 The standard raises inter-
esting questions of pleading and proofs.
Tribal Courts' difficulty with this situation is understandable.
Tribal sovereign immunity and its companion, official immunity,
are not traditional or customary Tribal doctrine, but are rather
grafted onto Tribal law. To broadly generalize Tribal customary law,
when one individual harms another, the individual or her family
must somehow repair the harm. 38 Immunity often stands in the
233. Rave, 23 Indian L. Rptr. at 6162.
234. Sulcer v. Barrett, 17 Indian L. Rptr. 6138, 6141 (Citizen Band Potawatomi Indians
of Okla. Sup. Ct. Sept. 5, 1990) (Rice,J., concurring).
235. No. 89-03-001-CV (APP) (Grand Traverse Band Ct. App. Aug. 19, 1993) (on file
with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
236. Id. at 5.
237. Id.
238. See Robert D. Cooter & Wolfgang Fikentscher, Indian Common Law: The Role of Cus-
tom in American Indian Tribal Courts (Part II of II), 46 AM.J. COMp. L. 509, 551-52 (1998) ("We
WINTER 2005]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 38:2
way of this customary method of handling disputes and injuries by
precluding tribal court jurisdiction to use its discretion to order or
negotiate an alternative dispute resolution mechanism. The unfor-
tunate result of the problem of the arbitrary and capricious Tribal
official is that, often, immunity prevents the injured party from
seeking a remedy. Perhaps Tribal Courts intentionally blur the lines
between Tribal sovereign immunity and official immunity in order
to come to a more correct result under Tribal custom." 9
C. (In)Adequacy of Remedy
As a general matter, Tribal Courts award reinstatement and back
pay in accordance with Tribal law to vindicated employees where
Tribal law permits these remedies. 24° Reinstatement may have its
own inherent difficulties. Moreover, the issue of whether rein-
statement to a comparable job is adequate creates fodder for
additional litigation.2 41 Despite the theoretical possibility of a rem-
edy, a discharged employee may be confronted with the possibility
of winning her case in Tribal Court, but receiving an inadequate
remedy. Attorney fees may be unavailable to the winner. Tort or
contract damages may be capped at a low threshold or may not be
available at all. Reinstatement to the previously-held position or to
interviewed a Navajo who said that when someone harmed another in the old days, people
would shun the injurer. The injurer's relatives would try to end the bad feeling by compen-
sating the victim.").
239. Cf id, at 563-64 ("On some reservations, custom is the 'underground' law of the
courts, in the sense that it affects many decisions without being explicitly recognized or
systematized in writing .... Tribal judges have the power to work their own social norms
into the fabric of tribal law.").
240. E.g., White v. Ho-Chunk Nation Dept. of Pers., 24 Indian L. Rptr. 6182, 6188 (Ho-
Chunk Nation Trial Ct. Oct. 14, 1996); Simplot v. Ho-Chunk Nation Dept. of Health, 23
Indian L. Rptr. 6235, 6243 (Ho-Chunk Nation Trial Ct. Aug. 29, 1996); Mitchell v. Brown, 24
Indian L. Rptr. 6128, 6129-31 (Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ct. Mar. 27, 1996); Brooks v.
Yellow Cloud Residential Ctr., 23 Indian L. Rptr. 6035, 6036 (1996) (Colville Confederated
Tribes Admin. Ct., Dec. 27, 1995); Frechette v. Menominee Tribal Enter., 24 Indian L. Rptr.
6082, 6083-84 (Menominee Tribal Ct. Nov. 19, 1995); Office of Navajo Labor Relations v.
West World, 21 Indian L. Rptr. 6070, 6070 (Navajo Nation Sup. Ct. Apr. 18, 1994); Hoopa
Valley Indian Hous. Auth. v. Gerstner, 22 Indian L. Rptr. 6002, 6007 (Hoopa Valley Ct. App.
Sept. 27, 1993); Oglala Sioux Tribal Pers. Bd. v. Moore, 16 Indian L. Rptr. 6051, 6051-52
(Oglala Sioux Ct. App. June 9, 1987); One Feather v. Oglala Sioux Tribal Public Safety
Comm'n, 16 Indian L. Rptr. 6042, 6043 (Oglala Sioux Ct. App. Aug. 7, 1986).
241. E.g., Kingsley v. Ho-Chunk Nation Pers. Dep't, 23 Indian L. Rptr. 6113, 6116-17
(Ho-Chunk Nation Tribal Trial Ct. Apr. 10, 1996).
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a comparable job242 may not be desirable or even advisable. The
standard of judicial review, if it benefits the employer, might affect
the likelihood of receiving a remedy. Finally, the adjudicatory
process may have numerous difficulties and disadvantages. At some
point, a plaintiff must decide whether it is worth proceeding with
the action.
1. Standard of Review and Form of Review-The Tribal govern-
ment has considerable discretion in determining how to proceed
with crafting its statute. As with the administrative review, the stat-
ute may severely limit the discretion of the Tribal Court in
reviewing the decisions of the Tribe to discharge an employee and
the administrative review panel in upholding the discharge deci-
sion. Many Tribes choose to emulate the "arbitrary and capricious"
or "abuse of discretion" standard of review adopted by federal
courts in reviewing the final decisions of federal agencies. 43
In contrast, tribal courts tend to adopt widely varying standards
where tribal law is silent. For example, one Tribal Court adopted a
242. E.g., Smith v. Ho-Chunk Nation, 26 Indian L. Rptr. 6121, 6123 (Ho-Chunk Nation
Sup. Ct. June 7, 1999) (remanding to Tribal Court to determine definition of "comparable
employment").
243. See, e.g., Eldred v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enter., 31 Indian L. Rptr. 6002,
6003 (Mashantucket Pequot Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2003) (discussing whether employment
decision was arbitrary and capricious); Hoopa Valley Indian Hous. Auth. v. Gersmer, 22
Indian L. Rptr. 6002, 6007 (Hoopa Valley Ct. App. Sept. 27, 1993) (adopting concurring
opinion in Ames v. Hoopa Valley Tribal Council 21 Indian L. Rptr. 6039, 6040 (Hoopa Valley
Ct. App. Nov. 14, 1991) (Irvin,J., concurring), that elucidated a "substantial evidence" test);
Stewart v. Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians, No. 02-01-784-CV, slip op. at
I (ruling regarding de novo review) (Grand Traverse Band Tribal Ct. Oct. 21, 2002) (quoting
Tribal personnel policy that allowed Tribal Court to rehear personnel case on the merits
where plaintiff could show abuse of discretion, arbitrary and capricious acts or decisions, or
noncompliance with applicable laws) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law
Reform); Baker v. Spirit Mountain Casino, 28 Indian L. Rptr. 6079, 6080 (Confederated
Tribes of Grand Ronde Cmty. of Or. Tribal Ct. Sept. 28, 2000) ("[T]he Court may remand or
reverse a Final Employment Decision if it is arbitrary and capricious; or an abuse of
discretion; or of the employees [sic] rights have been violated under the Tribal Constitution
or other Tribal or Federal law.") (citation omitted); Smith v. Ho-Chunk Nation, No. CV 98-
66 & CV 99-04, slip. op. at 9-10 (Ho-Chunk Nation Trial Ct. Feb. 28, 2000) (finding that
"[iln reviewing employment decisions, the Court decides if the decision of the agency was
arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion, giving deference to the agency's decision"),
available at http://www.ho-chunknation.com/government/judicial/opinions/20 0 3 /Smith%
20v.%20HCN%20et%20al.,%20CV98-66,%2099-04.pdf (on file with the University of
Michigan Journal of Law Reform); Johnson v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enter., No.
MPTC-EA-95-136 at 27 (Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ct. Dec. 11, 1995), available at
www.tribalresourcecenter.org/opinions/opfolder/1995.NAMP.0000026.htm ("Although the
Court may not substitute its own conclusions for that of the CEO, the Court's ultimate duty
is to decide whether the CEO acted arbitrarily, capriciously or illegally.") (citation
omitted) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), aff'd, 25 Indian L.
Rptr. 6011 (Mashantucket Pequot Ct. App. June 11, 1996).
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standard of review where it would not "disrupt findings of the
[administrative panel] absent pretext or a haphazard or contradic-
tory application of law."24" Generally, the reviewing court is
constrained to affirm the findings of fact of the hearing panel if
substantial evidence supports the findings. 45 Typically, the Tribal
Court's review is confined to the record.246 Other Tribes may
choose a de novo review.47 Of course, the greater the weight given
to the Tribe and the administrative review body, the less likely it is
that the employee will prevail in Tribal Court.
248
The Mashantucket Pequot employment code listed four factors
for the Tribal Court to consider when determining if an employ-
ment decision was "arbitrary or capricious":
(1) there was a reasonable basis for concluding that the
employee violated work rules, standards of conduct
or other conditions of employment for the position
held by the employee;
(2) progressive discipline policies were followed in
cases of minor infractions;
(3) the employee received notice of the alleged infrac-
tion and was provided with an opportunity to
contest the allegation and present mitigating cir-
cumstances; and
244. Hiller v. Ho-Chunk Gaming Comm'n, No. CV 99-72, slip op. at 16 (Ho-Chunk Na-
tion Tribal Ct. July 5, 2000), available at http://www.ho-chunknation.com/government/
judicial/opinions/cv99-72c.pdf (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Re-
form).
245. See, e.g., Short v. Hoopa Health Ass'n, No. A-99-008, slip op. at 6 (Hoopa Valley
Tribal Sup. Ct. Aug. 15, 2001) (finding that the "Appellate Court, in determining whether
the ... decision was arbitrary or capricious, must decide whether there was substantial evi-
dence to support the termination decision") (citing Gerstner, 22 Indian L. Rptr. at 6007) (on
file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); Hoopa Forest Indus. v. Jordan,
25 Indian L. Rptr. 6159, 6160 (Hoopa Valley Tribal Ct. Mar. 25, 1998) ("The Court will grant
relief from [an administrative] decision when the decision is not supported by evidence that
is substantial when reviewed in light of the whole ... ."); Ames v. Hoopa Valley Tribal Coun-
cil, 21 Indian L. Rptr. 6039, 6040 (Hoopa Valley Ct. App. Nov. 14, 1991) (Irvin, J.,
concurring).
246. E.g., Baker, 28 Indian L. Rptr. at 6080 ("Pursuant to the Employment Action Review
Ordinance this Court must limit and base its review on 'the record,' as submitted by the
parties.") (citation omitted).
247. E.g., Van Pelt v. Umatilla Reservation Hous. Auth., 26 Indian L. Rptr. 6149, 6150
(Umatilla Tribal Ct. July 22, 1999).
248. See Hitsman v. Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde Cmty. of Or., No. C-03-01-002,
slip op. at 2 (Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde Cmty. of Or. Tribal Ct. June 30, 2003)
(describing the standard of review as "a rather deferential one" and a "high bar" for a plain-
tiff to clear), available at http://www.grandronde.org/court/PublishedOpinions/hitsman
_opinion.pdf (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
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(4) the form of discipline was appropriate and did not
249
constitute an abuse of discretion.
Many petitions are disposed of quickly by Tribal Courts due to
the application of the deferential "arbitrary and capricious" stan-
dard, especially where the employee merely presents the argument
that the Tribe "should not" have discharged the employee rather
than a more compelling argument that the Tribe "could not" dis-
charge the employee. 25 0 These Tribal Courts do not second-guess
the discretion of the Tribal government.
Due process concerns may also affect the Tribal Court's deter-
mination of its authority to review the employment decision. At
least one Tribal Court would require the tribal government to pro-
vide discovery tools before the administrative hearing and would
allow the employee to be represented by counsel at that hearing or
the Court would not constrain itself to a review of the record.25'
Most Tribes will also choose to restrict the Tribal Court's mode
of review, just as a tribe might choose to waive its sovereign immu-
nity only under very narrow circumstances, in order to preserve
limited tribal assets. It is unlikely that, given the potentially exten-
sive process provided the employee at the administrative hearing
level that the Tribal statute will provide for a full-scale trial utilizing
the rules of complex litigation. As such, most Tribal Courts are lim-
ited in their review to simply going over the administrative
record.5 2 However, some Tribes allow a Tribal Court to review the
record and determine that there were fundamental flaws of some
2,5
sort in the process. In that event, the Tribal Court may remand
the case back to the administrative panel for a re-hearing or may
order a hearing itself. In some circumstances, a Tribal Court may
require a full trial or a hearing that mirrors the administrative pro-
ceeding.54
249. Garry v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enter., 26 Indian L. Rptr. 6186, 6188
(Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ct. Aug. 18, 1998) (citations omitted).
250. Whitaker v. Pierce, No. C-02-09-005, slip op. at 3 (Confederated Tribes of Grand
Ronde Cmty. of Or. Tribal Ct. Apr. 29, 2003), available at http://www.grandronde.org/
court/PublishedOpinions/WhitakerA-030429.PDF (on file with the University of Michigan
Journal of Law Reform).
251. E.g., Koon v. Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians, No. 95-07-048-
CV, slip op. at 3 (ruling on summary disposition) (Grand Traverse Band Tribal Ct. Feb. 3,
1998) (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
252. See id. But cf Katherine J. Wise, A Matter of Trust: The Elimination of Federally Funded
Legal Services on the Navajo Nation, 21 Am. INDIAN L. REV. 157, 165 (1997) (noting that the
Navajo Nation appellate courts follow a de novo standard of review).
253. See Koon, No. 95-07-048-CV at 3.
254. See id.
WINTER 2005]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
2. Contract and Tort Damages-In the author's experience, Tribal
Courts rarely award large damage awards to employee plaintiffs on
a wrongful discharge theory. This results from the fact that Tribes
guard their limited financial resources through the industrious use
of the sovereign immunity defense. At least one Tribe has capped
damage awards in employment disputes. 255 As a general matter,
however, unless the Tribe waives its immunity from suits bringing
tort and contract claims, the claims will be barred. 56
Some Tribal Courts may leave open the question of whether tort
claims may be brought when the Tribal constitutional or statutory
law is silent.257 For example, the Adams Court, apparently ignoring
the doctrine of sovereign immunity altogether, wrote in dicta that
it might allow contract and tort claims to proceed:
This court and the Tribal Court are both relatively newly es-
tablished, so the court is attempting to avoid unneeded
restrictions. The Tribal Court is the forum to determine the
fair interpretation of the employment contract in light of the
facts. It has the authority to review evidence and to fashion
damages or declaratory relief as it determines proper if that
court decides that there was an unjust breach [of contract].
The court must also decide whether libel or tortious interfer-
ence could be included as claims in any contract breach.
Other courts explicitly acknowledge that damages may not be
259
available, for example, under the Tribal Constitution.
255. E.g., Schmolke v. Ho-Chunk Nation, No. CV 01-05, slip op. at 14-15 (Ho-Chunk Na-
tion Trial Ct. Aug. 2, 2001) (discussing $10,000 damage cap), available at http://www.ho-
chunknation.com/government/udicial/opinions/cv-01-05.pdf (on file with the University
of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), aff'd, 29 Indian L. Rptr. 6012 (Ho-Chunk Nation Sup.
Ct. Dec. 8, 2001).
256. E.g., Long v. Mohegan Tribal Gaming Auth., 25 Indian L. Rptr. 6111, 6113-16
(Mohegan Gaming Disputes Trial Ct. Dec. 5, 1997).
257. E.g., Burnett v. Pioneer Chevrolet, Inc., 27 Indian L. Rptr. 6100, 6102 (Confeder-
ated Salish & Kootenai Tribes Ct. App. March 14, 2000); Adams -: Grand Traverse Band
Econ. Dev. Auth., No. 89-03-01-CV (APP) at 4-5 (Grand Traverse Band Ct. App. Aug. 19,
1993) (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
258. Adams, No. 89-03-01-CV at 4-5.
259. E.g., Sliger v. Stamack, No. 99-10-490-CV, slip op. at 3 (decision on motion for re-
consideration) (Grand Traverse Band Tribal Ct. Feb. 14, 2000) ("Relief... is only available
through a waiver of sovereign immunity adopted by tribal members through an amendment
of the Tribal Constitution, or by Congress in the exercise of its plenary power over Indian
tribes.") (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); Hawkins v. Grand
Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians, No. 98-04-148-CV, slip op. at 3 (decision on
summary disposition) (Grand Traverse Band Tribal Ct. Feb. 7, 2000) (on file with the Uni-
versity of Michigan Journal of Law Reform) (citing Grand Traverse Band Constitution art
XIII, § 2(b), available at http://thorpe.ou.edu/constitution/GTBcons3.html (on file with
the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform)).
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3. Attorney Fees and Costs-Following the same logic as limita-
tions in contract and tort damages, Tribes rarely provide for
significant attorney fees for the victorious former employee. Unlike
state and federal courts that may provide large attorney fees for
civil rights litigators, Tribal Courts are usually limited in their dis-
cretion to award attorney fees and costs. 26 Unfortunately, this
situation makes it extremely difficult for a truly wronged former
employee to seek legal representation. In many instances, lack of
potential attorney fees is dispositive in a lawyer's choice to repre-
sent a former employee against her former Tribal employer. Lack
of attorney representation often dooms an employee's Tribal Court
appeal.26'
There are some Tribal Courts that would act to award attorney
262fees under exceptional circumstances. In one case, In re
McSauby,2 63 a court held that, in a case with certain important con-
stitutional ramifications, the Tribal Court had authority not only to
award attorney fees, but also to require the Tribal government to
pay for the attorney up front. McSauby involved the potential re-
moval of a sitting Grand Traverse Band Tribal Council Member.
The respondent Council Member, the Court found, "was confused
about how to defend against this removal action because there is
another civil proceeding pending against him to rescind the land
260. E.g., Shomin v. Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa & Chippewa Indians, No. 92-05-
002-CV, slip op. at 3 (decision on costs and fees) (Grand Traverse Band Tribal Ct. July 7,
2000) (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform); Colvin v. Mashan-
tucket Pequot Gaming Enter., 27 Indian L. Rptr. 6126, 6219 (Mashantucket Pequot Tribal
Ct. Jan. 4, 1999); Johnson v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enter., 26 Indian L. Rptr. 6070,
6071-72 (Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ct. July 21, 1998). One court rejected a claim for
attorney fees, noting, "Had the [Tribal] Legislature intended that a wronged employee be
able to recover attorney or lay advocate fees, they would have specifically so stated." Smith v.
Beard, 28 Indian L. Rptr. 6006, 6013 (Ho-Chunk Nation Trial Ct. Aug. 10, 2000).
261. See generally Moreland v. Spirit Mountain Casino, 28 Indian L. Rptr. 6191, 6192
(Confederated Tribes of Grand Ronde Cmty. of Or. Tribal Ct. Mar. 7, 2001) (allowing pr se
petitioner's wide latitude, but unable to discern more than very broad and vague challenges
to his discharge) (citing Akao v. Shimoda, 832 F.2d 119, 120 (9th Cir. 1987)); Colton v. Con-
federated Tribes of Grand Ronde Cmty. of Or., 27 Indian L. Rptr. 6163, 6164 (Confederated
Tribes of Grand Ronde Cmty. of Or. Tribal Ct. May 25, 2000) ("Petitioner appears pm se and,
understandably, his claims therefore are not precisely linked to the Tribal Code provision
describing this court's standard of review.").
262. E.g.,Johnson v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enter., No. MPTC-EA-95-136 at 54
(Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ct. Dec. 11, 1995), available at www.tribalresourcecenter.org/
opinions/opfolder/1995.NAMP.0000026.htm ("The Court concludes that in order for an
employee to be entitled to an award of attorney fees, the employee must demonstrate that
the Gaming Enterprise engaged in particularly egregious overreaching.") (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform), affd, 25 Indian L. Rptr. 6011 (Mashan-
tucket Pequot Ct. App.June 11, 1996).
263. No. 97-02-001-CV-JR (Grand Traverse Band Tribal Ct. July 27, 1997) (en banc) (on
file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
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sale that is at the heart of the current land controversy. ''2 The
McSauby Court felt constrained by the respondent's inability to
handle the petitioner's important constitutional action and feared
that "the Court itself would have been forced by necessity to be
pro-actively involved with guiding the case through the judicial
process and, undoubtedly, guiding the defense if unrepresented to
ensure fairness, due process, and to just get the appropriate legal
arguments before the Court."265 In order to avoid the appearance
of impropriety and also to ensure the complete and uncompro-
mised analysis of that very important question of Tribal law, the
266Court ordered the Tribe to pay for all attorney fees and expenses.
4. Reinstatement or Comparable Job-As in non-Tribal settings, the
typical remedy for a vindicated employee is reinstatement or
placement in a job with comparable salary, responsibilities, and
prestige. However, in a Tribal government setting, reinstatement is
potentially disastrous. An employee with a poor working relation-
ship with her supervisor or her coworkers is not likely to succeed
after being reinstated in her previous position within a Tribe. Be it
awkward family relationships, unpleasant personal relationships, or
complex questions of competence, reinstatement of tribal employ-
ees often fails to solve the underlying problems between an
employee, the supervisor, and coworkers. In many instances, the
Tribe has no choice but to hire another employee to replace the
discharged employee. This is most often the case where the admin-
istrative hearing decision upholds the discharge and the case has
moved on to Tribal Court. No Tribe can afford to wait months or
years for a final decision from the Court.
Additionally, placement in another position may also be very dif-
ficult. The smaller the Tribe, the less likely the Tribe can locate a
comparable vacant position. Even if the Tribe does locate a compa-
rable position, the position may be physically located very near the
workplace of the previous position, thus creating difficulties of
proximity to the former workplace.
5. Length of Adjudicatory Process-As with most adjudicatory sys-
tems, the length of time it takes to begin a process that results in
the successful reversal of a decision to discharge an employee is
substantial and very prejudicial to both the employee and the em-
ployer. The process leading up to the administrative hearing alone
264. Id. at 1.
265. Id. at2.
266. See id. at 5.
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may take weeks or even months.67 In one particular case involving
the dismissal of the former emergency medical services coordina-
tor. for the Hoopa Valley Tribe's health clinic, it took nearly six
years from the time of discharge until final disposition of the case
by the Hoopa Valley Tribal Supreme Court to decide the matter.
No fewer than three previous written opinions appeared over the
six years as the case vacillated between the Hoopa Tribal Supreme
Court, the Hoopa Valley Tribal Court, and the administrative hear-
ing panel.269
In sum, there are no easy answers in order to create an effective
remedy for vindicated Tribal employees. One Tribal Court at-
tempted a novel approach by trying to circumvent the Tribe's
immunity that prevented the award of back wages by ordering the
Tribe to give the vindicated employee notice of all further vacan-
cies and ordering the Tribe to give the employee preference over
every other applicant, even Tribal Members and other Indians, for
six months.270 The court further ordered that if the Tribe defied its
other orders, the court would issue an order preventing the Tribe
from hiring anyone ahead of the vindicated employee.271 While the
ultimate result of this attempted solution is unclear, it is very likely
that these kinds of orders will not originate in many Tribal Courts
in the face of the Tribe's sovereign immunity defense.
IV. WRAPPING UP: LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS
FOR TRIBAL GOVERNMENT
It is axiomatic that solutions to problems in Tribal government
should take into account the Tribe's customs, traditions, and
267. E.g.,Johnson v. Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enter., No. MPTC-EA-97-120 at 44
(Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ct. Jan. 21, 1998), available at www.tribal-institute.org/
opinions/1998.NAMP.0000012.htm ("The laborious process of submitting and receiving
written questions and answers can consume weeks, even months, all while the employee, if
terminated, is out of a job.") (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Re-
form).
268. See Short v. Hoopa Health Ass'n, No. A-99-008, slip op. at 3 (Hoopa Valley Tribal
Sup. Ct. Aug. 15, 2001) (noting that the Tribe discharged the employee in October 1995)
(on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
269. Seeid.at3nn.1 &2,4n.3.
270. See Gonzales v. Allen, 17 Indian L. Rptr. 6121, 6124 (Shoshone-Bannock Tribal Ct.
Sept. 17, 1990).
271. See id.
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mores. "Native nations concerned about these consequences may
want to craft legal and political solutions that limit the application
of individual rights so that internal tribal social dynamics are
disrupted as little as possible."27 3 But what happens when the
problems are created, in large part, by the forced imposition of
Anglo-American law onto Tribal law?
As discussed, the most important factors to weigh in a Tribal
employment separation dispute are as follows: (1) the employee's
right to earn a living; (2) the Tribe's interest in employing good
employees; (3) the employee's interest in being blacklisted or
blackballed with future employers, including the Tribe itself; and
(4) the Tribe's sovereign right to decide its own internal affairs.
Adjudicating Tribal employment separation disputes in the general
structure of a pre-termination administrative hearing followed by
post-termination Tribal Court review imposes great disadvantages
on the Tribal community, the Tribal employer, and the Tribal em-
ployee, including: (1) the administrative and attorney costs to both
parties; (2) the delay in determining the outcome-a delay in
which an important government position goes unfilled and an em-
ployee goes unpaid, and a delay that may result in substantial
awards against the Tribal employer; (3) the sociological costs to the
Tribe, the supervisors, the employee, and other Tribal employees
who are involved in the process; and (4) the cost to the Tribe in
settling its disputes in a non-customary and non-traditional
method, a choice that amounts to adopting the ways of the domi-
nant culture over the untested ways of the Tribal culture.
This Article describes several possible solutions that some Tribes
have already selected, including a special court of employee
claims274 and a peacemaker-style dispute resolution mechanism,
and at least one that no Tribe (at least as far as the author is aware)
has selected, a step to eliminate adversarial adjudication of em-
ployee appeals altogether while simultaneously providing an
272. See, e.g., Hopi Indian Credit Ass'n v. Thomas, 27 Indian L. Rptr. 6039, 6040-41
(Hopi Tribe Ct. App. Nov. 20, 1998) (remanding to trial court to determine whether "Hopi
custom, traditions and culture" were relevant to the application of Arizona's statute of limi-
tations); Chatterson v. Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians of Or., 24 Indian L. Rptr. 6231,
6232 (Confederated Tribes of Siletz Indians of Or. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 1997) ("There are in-
stances, however, when tribal tradition, privileges or cultural beliefs should be considered by
the trial court...."). Cf Fisher v. Pigeon, 24 Indian L. Rptr. 6258, 6259 (Saginaw Chippewa
Tribal Ct. Dec. 28, 1996) (discussing traditional Indian law in context of tribal elections).
For a greater discussion of customary law, see Newton, supra note 5, at 304-14.
273. Goldberg, supra note 5, at 921.
274. See infra Part W.A.
275. See infra Part IV.B.
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automatic monetary remedy for discharged employees.276 This Arti-
cle does not propose a solution based on any individual Tribal
group's customs and traditions but rather a solution that simply
rejects the dominant culture's solution to government employment
separation. Of course, each Tribe must decide for itself based on its
own customs and traditions how to proceed in the future.
A. Separate Court of Employee Claims
Many Tribes choose the federal and state government method of
adjudicating the property rights of employees in the pre- and post-
termination hearing review model approved by the United States
Supreme Court in Loudermill. For some Tribes, nothing is likely to
move them away from this model. For these Tribes, who are likely
large Tribes with many hundreds or even thousands of employees,
the advantages of this model may outweigh the disadvantages. It is
doubtful that there are many Tribes in this category.
For those Tribes that find the Loudermill model necessary for po-
litical or other practical reasons, but find that the model still has
serious deficiencies, the creation of a separate court of employee
claims may alleviate some of those deficiencies. This modified
structure would most likely follow an arbitration model. Because
this court would hear nothing but employment disputes, the rules
and the procedures can be streamlined, theoretically reducing the
amount of time before a final decision is reached. If all disputes
are funneled into this court and there is no further Tribal Court
review granted, then the process is streamlined further. The adju-
dicator should be an expert in employment law and at least
knowledgeable in Tribal law. Following this model, several Michi-
gan Indian Tribes and the State of Michigan entered into an
omnibus tax agreement in 2002 and 2003 with a provision requir-
ing the use of an arbitration panel with specific expertise in tax law
and Federal Indian law.277 In this situation, the Tribe would have to
waive immunity to an extent necessary to enforce the arbitration
decision.
There are many advantages to such a system. Tribal employees
who were formerly conscripted to hear employment disputes
276. See infra Part IV.C.
277. E.g., Tax Agreement Between the Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians and
the State of Michigan § XIV.C., Dec. 20, 2002, at www.michigan.gov/documents/LTBB_
Agreement_58762_7.pdf (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform)).
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between their employer and their co-workers would avoid the
personal difficulties of hearing and deciding these cases. The Tribe
has the added advantage of increased productivity from not taking
valued employees out of their regular duties to hear these cases.
Unfortunately, placing the adjudication of Tribal employment
disputes in arbitration is relatively costly, requiring the creation of a
new legal body to hear the disputes. Furthermore, as with any adju-
dication, there will be winners, losers, and distressed individuals.
B. Peacemakers Court-Style Dispute Resolution
Another method to alleviate many of the harms associated with
the administrative and Tribal Court review of employment separa-
tions in Indian Country is to enact a form of the "Peacemaker
Court model"27 of alternative dispute resolution. Many Indian
Tribes are beginning to follow the Peacemaker Courts model
adopted most famously by the Navajo Nation 279 and the Seneca Na-
tion.280 Peacemaker Courts avoid the total, all-out-war of adversarial
adjudication. However, in highly emotional cases involving em-
ployment and potential civil rights claims, the Peacemaker Court
model may break down. A Peacemaker Court, by definition, re-
quires the consent of the parties to complete its function.281 The
model collapses if the parties do not reach a resolution and the
parties may end up in litigation regardless of the efforts of the me-
diators and court officials. Additionally, non-Indians and non-
Member Indians may strongly object to this form of dispute resolu-
tion and rarely, if ever, has it been utilized for "outsiders."
22
278. The "Peacemaker court" model is a generic title for a system of tribal court adjudi-
cation excluding formal rules of court procedure involving family members to resolve
disputes peaceably by consensus where all parties' concerns are addressed. See generally
Nancy A. Costello, Walking Together in a Good Way: Indian Peacemaker Courts in Michigan, 76 U.
DET. MERCy L. Rv. 875 (1999).
279. See Navajo Nation v. Intermountain Steel Bldgs., Inc., 42 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1229 (D.
N.M. 1999); Hon. Robert Yazzie, "Life Comes From It": NavajoJustice Concepts, 24 N.M. L. REv.
175, 185 (1994);James. W. Zion, Navajo Therapeutic Justice, 18 TouRo L. REv. 563 (2002).
280. See Bowen v. Doyle, 230 F.3d 525, 526-27 (2nd Cir. 2000); Robert B. Porter,
Strengthening Tribal Sovereignty Through Peacemaking: How the Anglo-American Legal Tradition
Destroys Indigenous Societies, 28 COLuM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 235 (1997).
281. See Goldberg, supra note 5, at 924 ("Because individuals must opt into [Peace-
maker Court], any potential individual rights claims are waived.").
282. Id. ("Through such a system, tribal members can function within the framework of
individual-collective relations that comports with the tribal worldview, while outsiders (in-
cluding investors) can be assured a more familiar set of procedures and rights in the
Western-style court.").
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Similar to the Peacemaker Court model, some Tribes place a
strong emphasis on "informal" resolution of employee-employer
disputes. The Hoopa Valley Court of Appeals in Hoopa Valley Indian
Housing Authority v. Gerstner 28 described the policy and practice of
the Hoopa Valley Tribe to resolve disputes in an "informal" matter
before proceeding to an agency hearing followed by Tribal Court
adjudication.284 The Court noted:
It is the established policy of the Hoopa Valley Tribe that be-
fore employee grievances escalate into formal proceedings,
informal resolution should be attempted. This policy is incor-
porated in provisions requiring written evaluations at least
annually, requiring unsatisfactory job performance be docu-
mented, requiring counseling on specific areas of poor job
performance to have occurred prior to termination or demo-
tion [citation omitted] and requiring the [administrative
review panel] to seek an informal resolution prior to institut-
ing formal procedures [citation omitted]....
In most cases this is appropriate. Most cases involve employees
disciplined by the executive director or agency head. The in-
formal conference between the executive director, or the
immediate supervisor, and the affected employee will preserve
the working relationship of the affected individuals, and will
correct the problem quickly, if informal resolution is
achieved.28 5
However, this policy is merely that-a policy. Nothing stops the
parties from refusing to resolve their differences in court. The
mess of formal and complex adjudication continues.
C. Stop All Adjudication of Tribal Employment
Separation Disputes
Another solution to the problem created by Tribal employment
separation is to eliminate adjudication altogether and keep these
cases out of Tribal Courts by providing an automatic monetary
remedy, set by the Tribe's governing body, similar to a severance
283. 22 Indian L. Rptr. 6002 (Hoopa Valley Ct. App. Sept. 27, 1993).
284. Id. at 6004-05.
285. Id. at 6004.
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package in all cases of employment separation. Though this avoids
the pain of formal adjudication, the limited amount of the auto-
matic payment might be harsh on the employee. This is not to say
that Tribal Courts are deficient in any way. In fact, it is impossible
to imagine a future of strong and capable Tribal governments
without a functioning and legitimate Tribal judiciary.8 6
This is perhaps the most radical proposal. This proposed solu-
tion would put a stop to the adjudication of Tribal employment
separation disputes. Simply put, each final decision to discharge an
employee would be accompanied by an up-front, lump sum pay-
ment to that employee in an amount equal to six months of salary
or wages. The Tribe would fund this lump sum payment with a tax
on Tribal employees sufficient to cover all payments and other
costs. 28 7 The Tribe must waive its immunity to the extent that a dis-
charged employee can recover the payment, but that is all.
Administrative and Tribal Court adjudication stops.
The primary and best advantage to this proposal is that the
harsh, complicated, and grueling hearing process to decide who is
right and who is wrong-an inherently unanswerable inquiry-
ends. No more testimony from witnesses and employees terrified of
retaliation and alienation. No more convening a tribunal of Tribal
government and Tribal Court employees to spend hours and even
days hearing and judging evidence and testimony. Every lawyer
286. See generally FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS: AMERICAN INDIAN LAW
AND CONTEMPORARY TRIBAL LIFE (1995). See also Bd. of Trustees v. Wynde, 18 Indian L.
Rptr. 6033, 6036 (Northern Plains Intertribal Ct. App. May 3, 1990). The Wynde Court,
sounding as if it were composed of non-Indians, wisely wrote that questions pertinent to a
Tribe's culture and traditions should not be left to a court of law:
Most assuredly, it is not the cross we bear as an appellate court to right every alleged
wrong, to predicate and postulate the redeeming righteousness of conduct we ap-
prove and abhor by deci[ding] the perceived unrighteousness of tribal conduct
within a cultural setting that just may view issues in a manner foreign to our own
sense of justice. Decisions predicated on cultural tradition and the need to preserve
the very existence of the tribe are better left to tribal members as constituents, the
tribal advocates, the tribal council and the elder statesmen of the tribe to be decided
in the context of political and social change within their culture. Never to be decided
on the basis of whim and fancy of an appellate court substituting its judgment on tra-
dition and cultural values peculiar to but most assuredly, part of that very tribal
culture.
Id.
287. Taxation of the employment of non-Indians is likely permissible under the theory
that the non-Indian has consented to the jurisdiction of the Tribe by entering into an em-
ployment relationship with the Tribe. See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Wong, 82 P.3d 263, 266 (Wash.
Ct. App. 2004) (holding that employment with an Indian Tribe "constitutes a 'consensual
relationship' over which the tribe is presumed to retain authority.") (quoting Cordova v.
Holwegner, 971 P.2d 531, 538 (Wash. Ct. App. 1999)).
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who has participated in any fact-finding hearing knows that the
facts that an impartial tribunal discovers never reveal the exact
truth. There is no such thing as exactness in litigation. In a difficult
situation where a supervisor and an employee cannot work to-
gether, both sides may be partially at fault. There is too much
subjectivity in a process that requires an objective, yes-or-no answer.
Tribal employment separation adjudication mixes the facts, poli-
cies, laws, emotions, livelihoods, reputations, Tribal government
services and programs, and people into a blender and comes out
with an imperfect and dehumanizing outcome, through no fault of
any of the participants. Because Tribal communities cannot repli-
cate the personal and emotional distance between jurors and
parties, the Anglo-American finding of fact by a jury does not work
for Tribes.
Due process is not ignored in such a system. Contrary to the
model where an employee's property is taken without compensa-
tion whenever 'Just cause" is found, under this proposal, the
employee's deprivation is always compensated. The deprivation of
the employee's employment as property is similar to a taking of a
real property owner's land, amounting to an eminent domain
analysis instead of an individual rights analysis. As a result, the
Tribe avoids expensive litigation that might result in massive tort
awards against it, while discharged employees who are members of
the Tribe may seek a political remedy.
A secondary, but still significant, advantage is the reduction of
economic costs to both the Tribe and the discharged employee.
Neither the Tribe nor the employee needs to allocate and pay for
legal expenses. The Tribe saves the expenses from forming and
maintaining an internal administrative body to hear numerous
employment cases a year, with its attendant costs to productivity
and morale.
Finally, resolution of the dispute is realized immediately.
Whether the termination decision was right, wrong, arbitrary, ca-
pricious, justified, or necessary becomes irrelevant. The Tribes
moves on and the employee moves on. The turmoil associated with
the adjudication, the accusations, and the discontent of an adverse
Tribal Court decision lingers and hopefully the healing process
begins sooner.
Immediate relief is the best reason to choose this model. What
Justice Thurgood Marshall wrote thirty years ago about federal
government employees applies with equal validity to Tribal gov-
ernment employees:
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Many employees may lack substantial savings, and a loss of
income for more than a few weeks' time might seriously impair
their ability to provide themselves with the essentials of life-
e.g., to buy food, meet mortgage or rent payments, or procure
medical services. [citation omitted] Government employees
might have skills not readily marketable outside the
Government, making it difficult for them to find temporary
employment elsewhere to tide themselves over until the
lawfulness of their dismissal is finally determined. In some
instances, the likelihood of finding alternative employment
may be further reduced by the presence on the employee's
records of the very dismissal at issue. Moreover, few employers
will be willing to hire and train a new employee knowing he
will return to his former Government position if his appeal is
successful. Finally, the loss of income may be 'temporary' in
only the broadest sense of that word. Not infrequently,
dismissed federal employees must wait several years before the
wrongful nature of their dismissal is finally settled and their
right to backpay established. 8
CONCLUSION
This Article argues that non-Indian principles of law, individual
rights, and justice imported into Tribal governments in the guise of
administrative review panels and judicial review seriously under-
mine Tribal government operations and communities.
There are no easy answers to the problems associated with Tribal
employment separation, just as there are no easy answers to em-
ployment separations in federal, state, and local governments, or in
the private sector. Indian Tribes, however, have a unique opportu-
nity to choose their own path. Tribal self-determination allows,
even compels, Indian Tribes to seek innovative and culturally sensi-
tive solutions.2 8 9 Whether those solutions follow a Euro-American
litigation model or a Peacemaker Court model or some other
288. Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 101-02 (1974) (Marshall,J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
289. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Drug War on Tribal Government Employees: Adopting the
Ways of the Conqueror, 35 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 68 (2003) ("Every tribe is a laboratory
of experimentation in favor of self-determination and the preservation of traditional tribal
values, and no other governmental body is more capable than a tribe's own leadership.")
(footnote omitted); Newton, supra note 5, at 293 ("These differences are a sign of creativity
as tribal councils and courts balance variances among the tribes' traditions and present
needs against the traditions and requirements of the dominant society's law.").
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model not discussed here, it is advisable for Tribes to choose and
try alternatives suitable to their unique situation and not necessar-
ily follow non-Indian models that destabilize non-Indian tribal
communities and erode Indian sovereignty. Resolution of disputes
arising out of Tribal employment separation must be significantly
modified to reduce the sociological, political, and emotional harms
that follow from incorporating this doctrine of Anglo-American law
onto Tribal communities.
If tribal employment separation disputes were taken out of the
realm of formal, adjudicatory court forums and concluded with a
lump-sum payment, then the troubled circumstances that Bear
Tenzing faced both as a supervisor and as a discharged employee
would have ended much sooner rather than drag on for months or
years. Though such a crude mechanism might appear arbitrary, the
non-monetary advantages to tribal governance and tribal societies
to avoiding these often-destructive legal disputes more than justify
this proposal.
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